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Airspace in a Green Economy
Troy A. Rule

ABSTRACT
The recent surge of interest in renewable energy and sustainable land use has made the
airspace above land more valuable than ever before. Unfortunately, a growing number
of policies aimed at promoting sustainability disregard landowners' airspace rights in
ways that can cause airspace to be underutilized. This Article analyzes several land use
conflicts emerging in the context of renewable energy development by framing them as
disputes over airspace. This Article suggests that incorporating options or liability rules
into laws regulating airspace is a useful way to promote wind and solar energy while
still respecting landowners' existing airspace rights. If properly tailored, such policies can
facilitate renewable energy development without compromising landowners' incentives
and capacities to make optimal use of the space above their lands. This Article also
introduces a new abstract model to argue that policymakers should weigh the likely
impacts on both rival and nonrival airspace uses when deciding whether to modify
airspace restrictions to encourage sustainability.
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INTRODUCTION
The sky holds some of the most promising solutions to the world's
toughest energy challenges. Although power from coal, petroleum, natural gas,
and enriched uranium currently fuels most economic activity around the
globe,' there is growing concern that relying primarily on those energy sources
is unsustainable and could threaten the environment. 2 Fortunately, while
prospectors search even deeper underground for subsurface fuels to meet
the planet's burgeoning energy demand,3 alternative energy strategies are
emerging that do not require any drilling. Wind and solar energy devices and
many "green development" techniques generate or conserve power by utilizing
resources found above the Earth's surface rather than by exhausting materials
found beneath it. Policies that promote these sustainable energy strategies are
placing unprecedented pressure on "airspace"-the invisible layer of space that
envelops the Earth's surface and fills its inner atmosphere.4
As coal mines, oil wells, and suburban sprawl are increasingly giving
way to solar panels, wind turbines, and smart growth, new conflicts are arising over the use of airspace. In cities, infill development' and urban tree

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

In 2008, more than 83 percent of the energy consumed in the United States was derived
from fossil fuel sources. Approximately 8 percent was from nuclear electric power. See US Energy
Consumption by Energy Source, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 2010), httpi//www.eia.doe.gov/
cneaf/solar.renewables/page/trends/tablel.html (indicating that 83.532 quadrillion BTU out of
99.438 quadrillion BTU in total consumed energy originated from fossil fuel sources and that
8.427 quadrillion BTU of all consumed energy was in the form of nuclear electric power).
Human and Natural Drivers of Climate Change, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications-anddata/ar4/wgl/en/spmsspm-humanand.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (describing dramatic increases in atmospheric greenhouse
gases since the year 1750, and noting that these increases have been "due primarily to fossil
fuel use and land use change" and have altered the "energy balance of the climate system").
Deep oil drilling garnered a significant amount of media attention after a major oil spill at a British
Petroleum deep-sea oil well in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. See, e.g., Neil King Jr. & Keith
Johnson, An Oil-Thirsty America Dived Into 'DeadSea,' WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2010, http://
online.wsj.com/artide/SB10001424052748704657304575540063579696700.html (stating that
the "pressures to drill deep in the Gulf water aren't going away," and noting that "Shell's newest
project sits in 10,000 feet of water, twice as deep as BPs ill-fated well, and relies on innovations
that regulators haven't even begun to wrestle with").
Airspace is also sometimes alternatively referred to as "skyspace." See Sara C. Bronin, Solar
Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1236 (2009) (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-907 (2003); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-40-1(2) (1995)).
The literature that suggests that infill development and greater urban density are important
means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions is too voluminous to catalog here. For a primer
and description of recent scholarship on this topic, see generally Alice Kaswan, Climate Change,
Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253, 258-66 (2009) (discussing research that
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programs6 are seeking to occupy more urban airspace, while solar access laws,7
green building incentives for natural indoor lighting,8 and urban garden
programs' are demanding that more of that space be kept open. In rural
areas, commercial wind energy projects are continuing to face opposition due to
their potential to disrupt migratory bird populations, 10 military radar systems, 1
and competing wind farms.12 All of these clashes are ultimately disputes over
scarce airspace.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

indicates that increased urban density, infill, and mixed-use development would significantly
reduce automobile use and carbon dioxide emissions). Because dense infill development is
often taller than sprawling development, scholars have identified building height restrictions as
contributors to sprawl. See, e.g., Bernard H. Siegan, Smart Growth and OtherInfirmities ofLand
Use Controls, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 693, 733 (2001) (noting that zoning ordinances
"limiting use, density, area and height" have caused "much greater sprawl than existed previous to
[their] imposition").
For a discussion of recent programs aimed at increasing and protecting tree populations in
major cities across the globe, see Irus Braverman, "Everybody Loves Trees": PolicingAmerican
Cities Through Street Trees, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 81, 82 (2008) (stating that
'"[g]reening the city' is currently a hot issue in the agenda of major cities worldwide" and that "[t]rees
are a significant aspect of this issue").
Existing solar access laws are critiqued in significant detail in Part IV.C. See infra notes
164-194 and accompanying text.
See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED 2009 FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND MAJOR
RENOVATIONS RATING SYSTEMI77-80 (updated 2010), availableat http://www.usgbc.org/
Showile.aspx?DocumentliD=7244 (describing requirements for earning one point toward LEED
certification for specified building design criteria related to natural interior daylight illumination).
LEED is a common acronym for the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design rating
system established by the U.S. Green Building Council to recognize energy efficient
building and land use designs. See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/
DisplayPage.aspx?CategorylD=19 (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). For additional discussion of this
issue, see infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
See, e.g., Catherine J. LaCroix, Urban Agriculture and Other Green Uses: Remaking the Shrinking
City, 42 URB. LAW. 225, 237 (2010) (noting that "no structures are allowed" in Cleveland's
recently created urban garden districts "except for small structures associated with the
permitted uses" and that fences in those districts can only be "up to six feet high").
See Hadassah M. Reimer & Sandra A. Snodgrass, Tortoises, Bats, and Birds, Oh My: ProtectedSpecies Implications for Renewable Energy Projects, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 545, 564 (2010)
(describing the problem of fatalities to migratory birds and other avian species from collisions
with wind turbine towers, blades, and related infrastructure).
See Elisabeth Burleson, Wind Power, National Security, and Sound Energy Policy, 17 PENN.
ST. ENvTL. L. REV. 137,141-43 (2009) (describing how commercial wind turbines can interfere
with military radar, and highlighting previous opposition to wind farms by the U.S. Department
of Defense on that ground). For a fill analysis of conflicts between wind energy projects and
military radar systems, see infra text accompanying notes 149-162.
See Troy Rule, A Downwind View of the Cathedral: Using Rule Four to Allocate Wind Rights,
46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207, 209-10 (2009) (describing the problem of wind turbine wake
interference between competing wind energy developers). Additional analysis of this issue
also follows in Part IV.A, infra. See infra text accompanying notes 134-148.
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Some policies enacted to address these new conflicts have ignored
landowners' long-held airspace rights in ways that could unintentionally hinder
rather than promote the efficient use of airspace." As the productive value of
airspace continues to expand, the effective utilization of that space grows ever
more imperative. What policies are best suited to allocate airspace among its
increasingly complex array of competing uses?
This Article analyzes several renewable energy development conflicts by
framing them as disputes over airspace. Applying microeconomic and property
theories to scrutinize these conflicts and the laws governing them, this Article
suggests that policies that acknowledge landowners' existing airspace rights are
best suited for facilitating renewable energy development and for promoting
efficient use of the space above land.
Part I of this Article discusses the distinction between airspace and other
natural resources such as wind and sunlight and describes how airspace rights
have evolved over time in response to technological and cultural developments.
Part II discusses the growing significance of airspace as a means of accessing
renewable energy resources and as a method of combating suburban sprawl.
Part III sets forth two overarching principles to guide policymaking for
airspace to address conflicts that may emerge from the sustainability movement.
Specifically, Part III.A argues that new airspace governance approaches
should build upon the common law's longstanding property regime, finetuning that regime through options or liability rules to advance sustainability
goals. Part III.B asserts that policymakers should weigh the potential impacts
of such policies on both airspace use that hinders others' concurrent use
(rival use) and use that does not (nonrival use) before adjusting bulk and height
restrictions to promote sustainability. Part IV applies these two principles to
examine renewable energy-related laws causing the underutilization of airspace
and identifies policies that might be more tailored to govern airspace rights
in the renewable energy context.
I.

PROPERTY IN AIRSPACE

Airspace is among the most ubiquitous of all natural resources, present in
every corner of the globe. Nonetheless, airspace is inherently scarce. Each cubic
inch of it exclusively occupies a unique spatial position in the universe.' 4 The

13.
14.

The shortcomings of several recent airspace-related renewable energy policies are the focus
of Part IV, infra. See infra text accompanying notes 133-210.
Other scholars have likewise noted the finite nature of airspace. See, e.g., J. Scott Hamilton,
A/location ofAirspace as a Scarce National Resource, 22 TRANSP. L.. 251, 289 (1994) ("Like real
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old adage "location, location, location" thus applies as much to the valuation
of airspace as it does to the valuation of surface land: Ownership rights in a
cube of remote, high-altitude airspace might be worth only pennies, even
though rights in an equivalent volume of airspace above a city's downtown core
might fetch millions of dollars. 5
Airspace is distinct from "air"-the life-sustaining blend of mostly nitrogen and oxygen gases that circulates around the planet. 6 Because air pollutants
freely course throughout the world's air supply, air is sometimes characterized
as a globally shared "commons."" In contrast, much of the space through which
air flows is not held in common but is separately owned or controlled. 8
Similarly, airspace is distinct from the countless invisible waves that
pass through air. Vibrating objects transmit waves through the air to deliver
music, spoken words, and other sounds to our ears.' 9 Modern electronic
equipment can also transmit electromagnetic waves of varying frequencies
through air, including waves capable of communicating information via

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

estate, airspace is a finite resource."). Although one could theoretically view airspace as
extending infinitely into outer space, this Article uses "airspace" to refer only to space situated
within the Earth's atmosphere.
See, e.g., Charles V. Bagli, $430 a Square Foot,for Air? Only in New York Real Estate, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/30/nyregion/30air.html (describing
two real estate developers' purchase of unused "air rights" for approximately $37 million from
owners of shorter downtown buildings to erect a thirty-five-story Manhattan apartment tower).
Not surprisingly, other scholars have observed the important legal distinction between "air"
and "airspace." See, e.g., John Cobb Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim Cujus Est Solum
in InternationalAir Law, 1 MCGILL L.J. 23, 36 (1952) ('The distinction between 'air' and
'airspace' was as clear in Roman law as it is today. The legal status of the air (or atmosphere)
which men breathed was not the same as that of the space through which the air circulated."); B.
Harrison Frankel, Three-DimensionalReal PropertyLaw: The TruthAbout Air Rights," 12 REAL
EST. L.J. 330, 340 (1984) ('The term 'air rights' is neither accurate nor descriptive. Air is a
chemical mixture.").
Garrett Hardin himself cited air pollution as a primary example when first describing his famous
"tragedy of the commons." See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243, 1245 (1968) (characterizing air as a commons because it "cannot readily be fenced" and is
thus susceptible to tragedies of excessive pollution).
Hardin seemed to have overlooked the important distinction between air and airspace in his
most famous article. See id (referencing the placing of "distracting and unpleasant advertising
signs into the line of sight" as an example of a "tragedy of the commons"). Much airspace that
can be "fenced in" is usually owned as private property and is thus far less vulnerable to the
"commons as a cesspool" problems that Hardin describes for water and air.
In fact, sound cannot travel through a vacuum of airspace. For a concise summary of how sound
waves travel through liquids, solids, and gases such as air, see generally Hector Judez,
Sound, ORACLE EDUC. FOUND., http //1ibrary.thinkquest.org/10796/ch9/ch9.htm (last visited Oct.
6, 2011) (noting that sound "cannot travel through a vacuum" and that sound waves travel faster
through liquids and solids than through gases).
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devices such as cellular phones, radios, and wireless computer receivers. 20 The
radio spectrum itself is a highly regulated commons in the United States,
subject to detailed policies from the Federal Communications Commission
for allocating transmission rights at various frequencies among private and
public parties. 21 Nonetheless, all of these waves are distinct from the airspace
through which they commonly pass.
On a similar theory, airspace is also fully distinguishable from the wind
currents and solar rays that fuel renewable energy generation. On calm evenings,
airspace can be largely devoid of wind and sunlight, whereas, on blustery
days, airspace serves as the medium through which these resources travel.
Because wind and solar radiation are practically inexhaustible, 22 they
arguably warrant no private property protection. 23 In contrast, airspace-a finite,
immovable resource-has justifiably enjoyed property protection for centuries. 24
Several of the land use conflicts arising from wind and solar energy
development in recent years have essentially been dashes over competing uses
of scarce airspace. Unfortunately, some well-intended laws responding to these
conflicts have blurred the vital distinction between airspace and the renewable

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

Microwaves, x-rays, and gamma rays are other important forms of electromagnetic radiation.
For a straightforward description of the electromagnetic spectrum, see generally Electromagnetic
Spectrum, NASA GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CTR., http://imagine.gsfr.nasa.gov/
docs/science/know_11/emspectrum.html (last updated Feb. 3, 2010) (comparing and
contrasting radio waves, light, microwaves, x-rays, gamma rays, and other types of electromagnetic radiation).
Although a discussion of laws allocating transmission rights across the radio frequency
spectrum falls outside the scope of this Article, there are excellent sources available on this
fascinating subject. See, e.g., Roscoe M. Moore, III, Business-Driven Negotiationsfor Satellite
System Coordination: Reforming the International Telecommunication Union to Increase
Commercially OrientedNegotiations Over Scarce Frequency Spectrum, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 51,
55-60 (1999).
See Hannah Wiseman, ExpandingRegional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
477 (2011) (stating that sunlight and wind "are nondepletable and do not pose traditional
commons problems" and "do not generally decline in quantity when harvested, unlike schools
of fish or grass in a pasture"). It should be noted that a turbine that "harvests" the kinetic
energy in wind does leave more turbulent, less energy-productive wind in its wake and can thus
disrupt downwind turbines. For additional discussion of turbine wake interference, see infra text
accompanying notes 134-148.
A methodology set forth by Carol Rose for determining the appropriate degree of property
protection for various commons resources comes to mind in this regard. See Carol M. Rose,
Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991
DUKE LJ. 1, 17 (arguing that a "do nothing" strategy of essentially providing no property
protection or regulation for a resource "might be most appropriate" for resources for which
"overuse or depletion costs" are low).
For a brief summary of the history of airspace law, see generally infra text accompanying
notes 29-71.
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energy resources passing through it. 25 Other laws have disregarded landowners'
existing airspace rights in order to favor particular airspace uses that support
renewable energy generation. 6 Both of these types of laws can unintentionally
cause the underuse of precious airspace. Analyzing these renewable energyrelated airspace conflicts is a critical first step toward structuring rules to
effectively govern these disputes.
To what extent does the growing importance of wind and sunlight
justify altering the laws governing the airspace through which those resources
travel? There is strong political support for renewable energy development in
the United States as a means of improving the nation's energy sustainability." One could argue that this socially valuable development's heavy reliance
on airspace warrants a serious revisiting of existing law in order to favor
newfound airspace uses. On the other hand, the law of airspace has been shaped
over hundreds of years to optimize the resource's productivity. Policymakers
traditionally fine-tune rather than overhaul airspace rights laws in response
to societal or technological changes. The following summary of the evolution
of airspace laws and how such laws have promoted the efficient use of airspace
helps put into context the substantial legal changes involving airspace today.
A.

The Ad Coelum Rule and the Origin of Airspace Rights

Airspace laws originally evolved much as Harold Demsetz might have
predicted: through the emergence of property rights in what was a previously
shared commons in response to technological innovation.28

25.
26.
27.

28.

Certain solar access laws discussed in Part IV.C, infra, fall within this category. See infra
text accompanying notes 165-173.
For a discussion of a handful of preemptive state laws aimed at promoting small wind turbine
installations that suffer from this problem, see infra text accompanying notes 199-203.
Such support is evidenced by the existence of substantial federal subsidies for renewable
energy development and state incentive programs aimed at promoting renewable energy
installations. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 48 (2006) (providing for 30 percent federal income tax
credits for installations of solar panels, small wind turbines, and certain other renewable energy
devices); DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://
www.dsireusa.org [hereinafter DSIRE] (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (providing a database of
state-by-state information on state-level incentives for renewable energy).
Harold Demsetz famously argued that clearer property protection for a resource was often
the product of "new technology and the opening of new markets, changes to which old
property rights are poorly attuned." Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967); see also id. (stating that "the emergence of new private or stateowned property rights will be in response to changes in technology and relative prices"); Amnon
Lehavi, Mixing Propety, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137, 143 (2008) ("Harold Demsetz's Toward
a Theory ofProperty Rights offers an evolutionary analysis (accompanied by vigorous normative
support) of human society's shift to private property as the pressure on resources increases and
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For much of recorded history, because most of the Earth's airspace was
beyond the physical reach of humankind, few conflicts arose regarding its
use. Out of practical necessity, the majority of the planet's airspace was merely a
commons through which landowners enjoyed sunlight and views. It is true that
laws in ancient Rome recognized that surface owners held rights in the
airspace above their land." The English common law doctrine of ancient
lights also indirectly limited some building heights to protect neighbors' access
to sunlight. 0 However, in early, agriculturally based societies, most landowners were primarily concerned with having rights to enough airspace to enable
the growth of their crops.3
As construction techniques gradually improved over the centuries, airspace
became an increasingly valuable resource, and rules clarifying property interests
in airspace naturally followed. Legal historians have traced the beginnings of
modern airspace law as far back as to the 1300s, when Cino da Pistoia
pronounced the maxim: Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum," 32 or, "[TO]
whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky."'3 This doctrine, commonly known as the ad coelum rule, established simple private property rights
in airspace based upon subadjacent parcel boundaries. The rule was subsequently
4
cited in Edward Coke's influential commentaries in the seventeenth century and
35
in William Blackstone's commentaries in the eighteenth century, cementing it

29.
30.

31.

32.
33.

34.
35.

technological or organizational innovations enable cost-effective delineation and protection of
private property.").
See Cooper, supra note 16, at 26 ("As early as Roman times the law recognized exclusive rights, both
public and private, in [air]space in connection with the use and enjoyment of the land below.").
See Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends andMeans in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 981 (2009) (noting that the "English common law
doctrine of 'ancient lights' gave landowners whose windows had unobstructed access to sunlight
for a certain period (generally twenty years) a permanent easement," but also noting that "this
doctrine was firmly rejected in the United States").
See Eugene J. Morris, Air Rights Are "Fertile Soil," 1 URB. LAW. 247, 250 (1969) ("In an
agricultural society where the surface level of the land, give or take a few feet, was the source
of the value of the land, the early focus of land law was logically, on the surface of the soil.").
The attribution of this phrase to Cino da Pistoia is found in Stuart S. Ball, The Vertical Extent
of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 631 (1928).
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 453 (4th ed. 1968). The full maxim reads, "cujus est solum, ejus
est usque ad coelum et ad inferos." Id. It is worth noting that the ad coelum maxim itself likely
was not extant in ancient Rome. See Cooper, supra note 16, at 50 ("It is now generally conceded
that the language of the maxim ... was not part of Roman written law. . . .When the maxim
is carefully analyzed, however, and reasonably construed, it is apparent that it must have sprung
originally from principles of Roman law - though stated in a non-Roman manner.").
See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 8
(19th ed. 1836), cited in Morris, supra note 31, at 249.
Id.
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as a fixture in English and American common law. 6 By the early twentieth
century, U.S. courts were applying the doctrine to find trespass for even
minor intrusions into airspace above privately owned land."
Henry E. Smith has classified the ad coelum rule as a simple "exclusion"
airspace regime because it allocates broad airspace rights to surface owners
based solely on property boundary lines and without regard for how the space
is used.38 Exclusion regimes are beneficial in that they clearly segregate and
define parties' respective rights and duties surrounding a given resource and can
facilitate the enforcement of those rights." Exclusion regimes also delegate
to individual owners-who are often in the best position to determine the
most productive use for the resource-the task of determining how airspace is
utilized.4 0 The Coase Theorem suggests that, by assigning resource entitlements
among individual parties, exclusion regimes can enable those parties to bargain
with each other in ways that ultimately allocate the resource to its highest
valued use.4 1 By establishing dear, enforceable private property rights in airspace,
the ad coelum rule encourages Coasean bargains among neighbors and promotes
allocative efficiency in airspace.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

See ROBERT R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 34 (1968) ("[T]he usque ad coelum
maxim, as we have seen, was in large measure a child of Coke, as far as its incorporation into
English law was concerned."); id at 35 ("Blackstone's Commentaries... reiterated Coke's viewpoint
on ownership of airspace. These Commentaries burst upon the scene practically on the eve of
American independence, and were accepted as 'quasi authority' in America.").
See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 16, at 60 (citing Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 93, 95 (1902)
(holding that reaching an arm across a property was a trespass because "it is one of the oldest
rules of property known to the law that the title of the owner of the soil extends .. .upward
usque ad coelum")).
See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two StrategiesforDelineatingProperty Rights,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 455 (2002) ("To set up [rights of exclusion], rough proxies like
boundaries and the ad coelum rule are used.").
See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law ofNuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965,
984 (2004) (noting that exclusion regimes "send a simple message to dutyholders-to keep
off-and this has value"). It is worth noting parenthetically that the costs of enforcing rights to
exclude in airspace are often higher than for surface land. Erecting a fence to peaceably deter
trespass onto a parcel's surface is far less expensive than preventing airborne vehicles or polluted
air from invading the space above the same piece of land.
Henry Smith has emphasized this information-cost advantage in support of the appropriate
use of exclusion regimes. See id. (noting that "[d]elegating the information-gathering function
through the exclusion strategy lowers information costs" and "frees ... courts. . . from having
to develop first-order information" about the relative values of potential uses of the resource
at issue); see also id at 985 (asserting that resource "[o]wners are closest to their assets" and "are
likely often to be the least cost generators of information about assets").
See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (arguing that, if transaction
costs of bargaining between parties are sufficiently low and a legal entitlement has been
assigned to one of them, the parties will negotiate the transfer of the entitlement to its highest
valued user).
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B.

Supplementing Ad Coelum: The Evolution of Modern Airspace Laws

Despite the strength of the doctrine, strict private property regimes like
the ad coelum rule have limitations. Resources sometimes reach a breaking
point at which they become so valuable to society that protecting strict property
rights in them is no longer cost-justified, particularly when high transaction
costs threaten to prevent the bargaining necessary for their efficient allocation.
In such situations, new regulations or some other forms of "governance" rules
may be needed to promote those uses of the resource such that it will maximize
the aggregate social welfare. 4 2 In Henry E. Smith's words:
As multiple use [of a given resource] becomes more important,
a governance regime of some sort should tend to emerge, either by
contract, regulation, or modification of common-law rules... [R]ising
resource values should lead to increasing precision of rights. For a
given resource, this means a tendency to move to supplement exclusion with governance rules.43
Smith's predictions have generally proven true for airspace. As technological advancements have expanded the scope of competing uses for airspace
over time, new governance strategies have emerged. The following Subparts
describe how new governance rules have gradually supplemented the ad coelum
doctrine over the past century in response to modern innovation.
1.

Navigable Airspace as a Regulated Commons

Prior to invention of the airplane, courts rarely encountered disputes
between air travelers and landowners over competing uses of airspace. 44
However, that changed abruptly in the early twentieth century when propellerdriven vehicles began soaring through the sky. 45 Airspace laws adapted
to modern aviation by introducing new governance rules that clarified and built
upon the ad coelum rule's rigid exclusion regime.

42.

43.

44.
45.

See John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property,
1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 3 (noting that "as [a] resource becomes scarce, society's stake greatly
increases, and the laws [governing it] tend to become complex").
Smith, supra note 39, at 1005-06. Smith added that a "wide range of rules, from contractual
provisions, to norms of proper use, to nuisance law and public environmental regulation can be
seen as reflecting the governance strategy." Smith, supra note 38, at 455.
At least one court speculated about the issue in dicta. See infra note 52.
For a fascinating summary of the debate among early twentieth century judges and scholars
over how to reconcile common law rules governing airspace with the advent of modern
aviation, see generally STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? 85-100 (2008).
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A clash between airplanes and farmers gave rise to what is perhaps
the best known case clarifying the scope of landowners' airspace rights. 4 6 The
plaintiffs in United States v. Causby4 7 owned a chicken barn situated about 2200
feet from the end of a municipal airport runway.4 8 Commercial airplane flyovers
had previously caused minimal problems for the Causbys' chicken farming
operation, but that quickly changed when the U.S. military began leasing the
airport in 1942.49 The heavy bombers and fighter planes that began roaring
overhead repeatedly startled the plaintiffs' chickens into a panicked frenzy.
Several chickens per day died from frantic collisions with the barn walls.so
Frustrated by the airplane flyovers and their effects on the farm, Mr. and
Mrs. Causby sued to recover damages for what they claimed was the military's
compensable Fifth Amendment taking of rights in the airspace above their land.
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately decided the Causby case, upholding
the lower court's ruling that Mr. and Mrs. Causby were entitled to compensation
for the military's repeated flights over their land."' The Court refrained from
literally applying the ad coelum rule to reach its holding, noting that landowners'
airspace rights did not extend indefinitely into the sky above their land.52
Instead, the Court cited federal legislation to dedare that "navigable"53 airspace
was a "public highway' for air travel and was not under the exclusive control of
surface landowners. 54 Accordingly, military over-flights could only trigger

46.

47.
48.
49.
50.

51.
52.

53.

54.

The other case that would seem a likely nominee for this distinction is Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1977), which held that no compensable
regulatory taking resulted from a historic landmark ordinance's severe limitation on a landowner's
rights to occupy valuable airspace above its property.
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
See id.at 258.
Seeid at 258-59.
See id at 259 (noting that "[a]s many as six to ten of [the Causbys'] chickens were killed in one
day by flying into the walls from fright" and that the "total chickens lost in that manner was
about 150").
See id.at 266-67.
See, e.g.,
Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Camp. 219, 171 Eng. Rep. 70 (1815), cited in Note, TheAir Space as
Corporeal Realty, 29 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1916). Pickering is an English case in the early
nineteenth century wherein "Lord Ellenborough, explaining his decision by supposing a case of
an aeronaut traversing the air in a balloon high over divers closes, held that trespass did not lie
for a board projecting over the plaintiffs garden." Note, supra, at 525. Other commentators have
noted the inappropriateness of literal readings of the ad coelum doctrine. See, e.g., Cooper,
supra note 16, at 50 ("Literally translated[,] the maxim leads to the obvious absurdity of
claiming for the landowner private exclusive 'dominium' (ownership) of space above his lands
up to infinity.").
Generally, "navigable airspace" is any airspace exceeding five hundred feet above ground level.
Within six miles of airports, the scope of navigable airspace can be greater. See 14 C.F.R.
§ 77.17 (2009).
Causby, 328 U.s. at 264.
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compensable takings of airspace easements in situations like the Causbys' in
which the flights were "so close to the land as to render it uninhabitable." 5 5
Although Causby placed some limits on the scope of landowners' airspace
rights under the ad coelum doctrine, it also made clear that landowners held
enforceable property interests in the usable airspace above their parcels. To
quote from the opinion:
The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground
as he can occupy or use in connection with the land ... The fact
that he does not occupy it in a physical sense-by the erection of
buildings and the like-is not material. . . We think that the
landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that
invasions of it are in the same category as invasions of the surface." 6
Causby and related legislation clarified the scope of landowners' airspace
rights to address conflicts that were arising from the introduction of modern
flight. The governance rules established under Causby and corresponding statutory law converted navigable airspace into a regulated commons-a communally
shared layer of high-altitude space that is openly accessible for air travel and
reserved for that purpose." Robert Ellickson has defended this vertical stratification of airspace rights on efficiency grounds, noting that it facilitates more
productive overall use of airspace in the aviation age.

55.
56.
57.

58.

id.
Id at 264-65.
See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2) (2006) (providing that a "citizen of the United States has a
public right of transit through the navigable airspace"). Because airspace can be utilized for
centuries without ever depleting or wearing out, these new governance rules created minimal
risk of Garrett Hardin's famous "tragedy of the commons" afflicting navigable airspace. In
contrast to the grazing lands Hardin described, airspace perpetually retains its nature
regardless of how intensely it is used over time and thus suffers no risk of tragic degradation
when communally shared. To review Hardin's famous article on commons tragedies, see generally
Hardin, supra note 17, at 1243-48; see also H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a
Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE LJ. 1315, 1363-64 (1993)
("Aviation ... activities are generally most efficiently undertaken over an area whose horizontal
scope is much larger than that optimal for agriculture, housing, and other basic land-surface
operations. Groups have responded by imposing vertical limits on the standard rights and
privileges conferred on surface landowners. For example, landowners everywhere are now
subject to avigation easements .. .. Dividing space into layers fascilitates exploitation of the varying
returns to horizontal scale that are available in different layers.").
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Subdividing Airspace: Modern Condominium Laws

In the late nineteenth century, improvements in construction technologies 59
and the modern elevator 60 prompted a different set of airspace governance rules
to further supplement the adcoelum rule's exclusion regime. For the first time
in history, these and other innovations enabled high-rise development to flourish,
particularly near urban cores where space was already at a premium. Accordingly, builders' newfound abilities to build upward catalyzed unprecedented
development of city airspace. 1
The enhanced value of urban airspace resulting from new high-rise
construction techniques in the early twentieth century prompted calls for
greater precision of airspace rights among property owners. It became increasingly common during this era for structures containing dozens of separately
owned suites or apartments to sit atop single surface parcels. During the period,
some courts held that one must own underlying surface land in order to own
the overlying airspace. 62 It would be difficult for each of a building's several
unit owners to understand her rights in the supporting soil or in the cubes of
airspace occupied by their respective units without new laws.
Eventually, developments in condominium law helped clarify airspace
ownership rights. Although condominiums trace back to ancient times,63 laws
governing condominiums underwent dramatic expansion in the 1960s, with
most ultimately providing that a single condominium unit owner could hold
59.

60.

61.

62.

See Michael R Montgomery, Keeping the Tenants Down: Height Restrictions and Manhattan's
Tenement House System, 1885-1930, 22 CATO J. 495, 499 (2003) (describing a "revolution in
building techniques" in the 1870s "due to steel-frame construction methods, new fire-resistant
technologies, and related innovations, paving the way for the construction of far taller
buildings"); John R. Nolon, The Law of Sustainable Development: Keeping Pace, 30 PACE L.
REV. 101, 109 (2010) ("By the end of the 19th century, steel-frame construction made it
possible to build sky scrapers-a brand new urban form.... Steel-frame construction also
facilitated the building of tall loft buildings . . . .").
See Montgomery, supra note 59, at 499 (explaining that "Otis' invention of the safety elevator"
in the mid-nineteenth century eliminated the "need to climb several flights of stairs to reach one's
workplace or residence," which had previously been a significant constraint on building heights).
New York City is a prime example of an urban center whose skyline was transformed by the
development of high-rise building methods. See id. (noting that "[g]round rents in Manhattan
were high" during the mid- to late-nineteenth century and that "[t]all-building technologies
eased this problem, and during the latter part of the 1870s and early 1880s numerous structures
greater than 10 stories began to appear in various sections of the city").
See, e.g., Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 491 (1906) (stating that the "law regards
the empty space" above land as "inseparable from the soil"), cited in Terence Kennedy, New
York City Zoning Resolution Section 12-10: A Third Phase in the Evolution ofAirspace Law, 11

FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1039, 1044 (1983).
63.

See Morris, supra note 31, at 249 (stating that the condominium "has been traced back as far
as the Babylonian law of 2,000 B.C.").

HeinOnline -- 59 UCLA L. Rev. 283 2011-2012

284

59 UCLA L. REV. 270 (2011)

title to the three-dimensional airspace occupied by her condominium unit.64
Federal legislation enacted during the same period enabled the Federal
Housing Administration to issue real estate mortgage insurance secured on
condominium units.65 The practical effect of these laws was to allow the
subdivision and transfer of exclusive rights in airspace-rights totally separate
from ownership of the surface land below. Like the laws for navigable airspace,
these condominium laws were governance rules structured to clarify and
supplement the ad coelum rule's exclusion regime in ways that accommodated
an important new airspace use.
3.

Open Airspace: Bulk and Height Restrictions

Although the proliferation of high-rise apartment and office tower
construction in the early twentieth century increased the value of urban airspace,
it provoked fear and anger in some communities. Neighborhood opposition
to tall buildings arose almost as quickly as the skyscrapers themselves. City
dwellers began complaining that the massive structures blocked natural
sunlight 66 or that they were fire hazards because existing hoses and ladders
could not reach their upper floors. 7 Some opponents even feared that lofty
buildings could become havens for infectious diseases. 68
In response to mounting political pressure in this new age of high-rise
buildings, municipalities began adopting height restrictions, building setbacks,
lot coverage ratio requirements, and other ordinances to limit building bulk

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

Other scholars have noted how condominium laws responded to the increased value of
airspace by recognizing it as a real property unit in the condominium context. See, e.g.,
Bronin, supra note 4, at 1250 (noting that the "proliferation of dense, high-rise
condominium buildings gave rise to horizontal airspace as a unit of real property-a concept
in property law, which had not existed before the advent of skyscrapers" (citing Daniel P.
Moskowitz, Legal Access to Light: The Solar Energy Imperative, 9 NAT. RESOURCES LAW.
177, 184 (1976))).
See Frank Schnidman & Cameron Roberts, MunicialAirRights: New York City's Proposalto
SellAir Rights Over Public Buildings and Public Spaces, 15 URB. LAW. 347, 350 (1983) (citing
the Federal Housing Administration regulations as "defin[ing] a mortgage on air space").
See Montgomery, supra note 59, at 502 ("Longstanding legal traditions in the common law
suggested-but did not clearly indicate-that homeowners enjoyed rights to that sunlight
which 'naturally' would reach a building lot they owned. Tall buildings [erected in the
1870s and 1880s] threatened this perceived right by casting huge shadows.").
See id. at 503 (noting that "[f]ireproofing technologies" in the late nineteenth century "were
imperfect, and the upper stories of tall buildings could not be reached by firefighters' ladders
and hoses").
See id. ("More populated buildings, it was argued, had a higher risk of spreading contagious
diseases among people living or working in them.").
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and height.69 Despite their restrictiveness, such regulations have become
commonplace in communities throughout the country.70 Although bulk and
height restrictions force landowners to forfeit their rights to occupy the
airspace above their land, such restrictions are typically reciprocal in that they
require nearly all neighboring landowners to give up those same rights and
nearly all landowners get the same general benefit from the restrictions.
Whether adopted by municipal governments or recorded in private subdivision
covenants, bulk and height restrictions that are reciprocal in nature generally
respect existing airspace rights. In that sense, they are yet another example of
governance rules designed to build upon rather than undermine the basic
exclusion regime for airspace.
II.

SUSTAINABILITYAND THE SKY: THE GREEN MOVEMENT'S
INCREASED PRESSURE ON AIRSPACE

As just described, policymakers over the past century have gradually
responded to social and technological changes affecting airspace with governance rules designed to supplement the ad coelum rule's exclusion regime.
However, new airspace uses emerging from the sustainability movement in recent
years have further complicated the task of governing airspace rights. Difficult
new policy questions are arising in part because, as the following Subparts
describe, some sustainable land use strategies require the occupation of
additional airspace, whereas others necessitate that more airspace be kept open.
A.

Growing Calls for Open Airspace

Several types of renewable energy and green development strategies
require open airspace. Unoccupied airspace allows sunlight and wind to

69.

70.
71.

See id. at 503-04 (explaining that "in June 1885, the New York State legislature passed a bill
restricting the height of all residential buildings henceforth to be built in Manhattan to a
maximum of 70 feet on the narrower streets and avenues, and 80 feet on the wider streets and nornal
avenues"); see also Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 106 (1909) (upholding the constitutionality of
Boston city ordinances enacted in 1904 and 1905 that imposed maximum building height
restrictions on designated districts within the city, and declaring that "regulations in regard to
the height of buildings . . . made by legislative enactments for the safety, comfort, or convenience
of the people, and for the benefit of property owners generally, are valid" if they "can be plainly
seen to be not unreasonable or inappropriate").
A detailed analysis of when bulk and height restrictions may be warranted for particular
airspace is set forth in Part III.B.3, infra. See infra text accompanying notes 127-133.
Other scholars have characterized zoning restrictions in this fashion. See, e.g., WILLIAM A.
PISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 54 (2001) ("Robert Nelson [] and I have said for
a long time and in many places that zoning is best thought of as a collective property right ...
")
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reach plants, buildings, and renewable energy devices without interruption-a
valuable function in our increasingly green economy.
One sustainability-oriented use for open airspace is to prevent the
shading of solar energy devices. Commonly known as "solar access" protection,
the need for contractual or legal protections against the shading of solar
energy devices has been the subject of numerous statutes, ordinances, and
law review articles over the years. 72 Photovoltaic solar panels" and passive
solar energy systemS 74 generate and save significant amounts of power,
thereby reducing an economy's dependence on fossil fuels and other conventional energy sources. However, these and most other solar energy devices are
far more productive when exposed to direct sunlight. Shade from trees or
other structures in the airspace above nearby land can diminish a solar
panel's productivity. The risk that trees or buildings could ultimately pop up
in neighboring airspace and shade solar energy systems deters some
landowners from investing in rooftop solar installations.75
The demand for laws to protect solar access has rapidly grown over the
past few years due to an unprecedented interest in rooftop solar energy development. 6 Accordingly, government-provided incentive programs are supporting

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

Two recent law review articles provide detailed discussions of solar access laws. See generally
Bronin, supra note 4, at 1226-36; Troy A. Rule, Shadows on the Cathedral:SolarAccess Laws in
aDifferent Light, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 857-58, 873-80.
Photovoltaic solar panels are typically modules of small crystalline cells holding substances that
are formulated to catalyze electricity-generating chemical reactions when struck by sunlight.
See Bernadette Del Chiaro & Rachel Gibson, Government's Role in Creating a Vibrant Solar
Power Market in Calffornia, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 347, 353 (2006).
"Passive" solar energy devices such as solar heat-oriented building designs and solar water
heaters utilize solar radiation to directly heat water or buildings. For basic descriptions of these
energy strategies, see generally Learning About Renewable Energy: Passive Solar, NAT'L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/learning/re-passive-solar.html
(last
updated Sept. 29, 2009).
Initial investments in rooftop solar panels can be quite significant and take several years to be
recouped from energy savings. See Jason Coughlin & Karlynn Cory, Solar Photovoltaic
Financing: Residential Sector Deployment, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., at v (Mar.
2009), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/44853.pdf (determining that the initial capital
requirement for installing a residential photovoltaic system was between $12,000 and $23,000,
even after taking into account all government-offered incentives).
The economic recession of 2008 adversely impacted solar panel installation rates. However,
industry growth remains quite strong in the context of residential rooftop solar energy. See SOLAR
ENERGY INDUS. Ass'N, US SOLAR INDUSTRY: YEAR IN REVIEW 2009, at 2 (2010), available at
httpI//www.seia.org/galleries/default-file/2009%20Solar%20Industy/o20Year%20in%20Review.pdf
(stating that total United States photovoltaic generating capacity increased by 37 percent over
2008 but that residential installations more than doubled). For obvious reasons, solar access
tends to be more relevant in the residential context than in commercial solar energy development.
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solar energy more aggressively today than ever before."
As the costeffectiveness of rooftop solar energy grows, so does the need for laws enabling
landowners to protect their solar energy systems from shading by neighbors.
Urban gardens can also require a degree of direct solar access that only
open city airspace provides. An increasing number of cities throughout the
country are encouraging the cultivation of gardens on inner city lots as a
means of combating blight and improving urbanites' access to fresh local
produce." Of course, the successful growth of many food plants requires adequate sunlight. This need for unobstructed sunlight can also potentially constrain
the development of airspace above neighboring parcels."
Even in the context of green building, access to sunlight via open airspace
has taken on added value in recent years. The U.S. Green Building Council's
2009 Rating System rewards points toward LEED (Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design) Certification for building designs that satisfy
specific natural daylight illumination requirements." Natural lighting through
skylights and windows conserves energy by mitigating the need for electrical
light.8 ' Unfortunately, shade from neighboring buildings or trees can reduce

77.
78.

79.

80.
81.

For a summary of recent federal and state policies promoting solar energy development, see
id. at 2-5.
See LaCroix, supra note 9, at 235-36 (citing CLEVELAND, OHIO, ORDINANCES tit. VII, ch.
336.01 (2009)) (describing urban agriculture plans in Youngstown and Cleveland in Ohio and
in Detroit, Michigan, and citing portions of the Cleveland Zoning Code indicating that the
city's purpose for creating its Urban Garden District was to "meet needs for local food
production, community health, community education, garden-related job training, environmental
enhancement, preservation of green space, and community enjoyment on sites for which urban
gardens represent the highest and best use for the community").
Land use restrictions within Cleveland's Urban Garden District at least suggest that urban
garden development can have a constraining effect on airspace. See id. at 237 (noting that only
"small structures associated with the permitted uses" are allowed within the urban garden district
and that fences within the district may not exceed six feet in height).
See supra note 8.
The energy-saving benefits of natural lighting designs for buildings are so great that some
public utilities reward such designs alongside distributed renewable energy generation. See,
e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1802.B.6 (providing that "[s]olar [d]aylighting," defined as
the "non-residential application of a device specifically designed to capture and redirect the
visible portion of the solar beam, while controlling the infrared portion, for use in illuminating
interior building spaces in lieu of artificial lighting," constitutes a "[d]istributed [r]enewable [e]nergy
[r]esource" together with renewable energy devices such as small wind turbines and passive solar
energy systems). As a consequence, homeowners making solar daylighting improvements
sometimes qualify for comparable incentives from utilities seeking to comply with state renewable
portfolio standards. See, e.g., Incentives for Solar Daylighting, APS RENEWABLE ENERGY
INCENTIVE PROGRAM, http://www.aps.com/main/green/choice/choice 41.htmnl (last viie
Oct. 12, 2011) (describing eligibility of solar daylighting devices for up-front financial
incentives under the Arizona Public Service Renewable Energy Incentive Program).
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the degree of interior illumination achievable on a given parcel, necessitating
greater reliance on electricity-dependent artificial light sources.
One other potential use for unoccupied urban airspace is to provide wind
access for "small" wind turbines. Wind turbines convert the kinetic energy in
wind into electric power. Small turbines are petite versions of commercial turbines and usually generate only enough power to offset a portion of a single
landowner's energy consumption." These devices may not require direct
sunlight, but they still need a substantial amount of open airspace to function
effectively. They are more productive the higher they reach into the sky83 and
can require hundreds of feet of open airspace in the upwind direction to
ensure that wind flowing into them is largely undisturbed. 84 Wind access for
small turbines has historically been a low priority in most jurisdictions,
although this could change as these devices become increasingly cost-effective
and the demand for them continues to grow."
B.

Mounting Pressure to Occupy Airspace

Despite the myriad of uses for open airspace just described, physically
occupying airspace with buildings, trees, or other structures also creates
substantial value in many circumstances. The sustainability movement is also
bolstering demand for this other category of airspace uses.
Filling more urban airspace with buildings has become an increasingly
attractive policy option in the past few decades as the damaging effects of

82.

83.

84.

85.

See AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, THE U.S. SMALL WIND ThRBINE INDUSTRY ROADMAP
8-9 (2002) (noting that the generating capacity of small wind turbines ranges from 400 watts "for
specific small loads such as battery charging for sailboats and small cabins" to 100 kilowatts
"for large loads such as a small commercial operation").
See David Mears, Feasibilityof Residential Wind Energy: The Lack of Regulatory Integrationfor
Local Communities, 37 REAL EST. L.J. 133, 137 (2008) ("Winds are faster at higher elevations,
causing wind power to increase by a factor of three as the speed increases. This means that
even a small boost in height greatly enhances a turbine's output."), cited in Troy A. Rule,
Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1223, 1239.
See AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: How AND WHY TO PERMIT
FOR SMALL WIND SYSTEMS 6 (2008) (stating that the "bottom of the turbine rotor should
dear the highest wind obstacle (rooftop, mature tree, etc.) within a 500 foot radius by at least
30 feet").
The total generating capacity of small wind turbine installations in the United States has grown since
January 2007. ~See AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, SMALL WIND TURBINE GLOBAL MARKET
STUDY 17 (2010), available athttp://e360.yale.edu/images/digest/2010_AWEA_Small_
WindTurbine_GlobalMarket Study-1.pdf.
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suburban sprawl have become evident.86 Sprawling development on the suburban
fringe tends to require more public infrastructure than dense urban infill
projects and can also result in comparatively longer commutes and greater
energy consumption." As a result, some have advocated land use policies that
loosen height restrictions and make more intense use of urban airspace."
Taller buildings provide more work and living space per acre, leaving more
land available for green spaces and easing the pressure for suburban
expansion. High-rise development can be particularly valuable when situated
near public transit systems because of the comparatively low burden it places
on traffic congestion and transportation infrastructure. 89 For these and other
reasons, vertical building designs are commonly viewed as relatively ecofriendly approaches to real estate development. 90
Cities are also seeking to enhance their environmental sustainability by
filling more of their skylines with trees. In recent years, tree preservation and
planting programs have begun sprouting up in major cities throughout the
world.91
In some regions, trees that shade buildings can reduce air

86.

87.

88.

89.

90.

91.

For a fascinating discussion of sprawl and of the history of efforts to identify and quantify its
costs to society, see generally ROBERT W. BURCHELL ET AL., THE COSTS OF SPRAWLREVISITED (1998).
See, e.g., Alain Bertaud &Jan K. Brueckner, Analyzing Building-Height Restrictions: Predicted
Impacts and Welfare Costs, 35 REGIONAL Sci. & URB. ECON. 109 (2005) (concluding that
height restrictions imposed in Bangalore, India, imposed welfare costs on the city's citizenry in
the range of 1.5 to 4.5 percent of household consumption); see also BURCHELL ET AL., supra
note 86, at 3 (projecting that, if sprawl in South Carolina were to remain unchecked, "statewide
infrastructure costs for the period 1995 to 2015 [would] be more than $56 billion, or $750
per citizen per year for the next twenty years").
See, e.g., Stephen Sussna, Another Look at Height Regulations andAir Rights, 57 APPRAISAL
J. 109, 117 (1989) (arguing that "[m]ore sensible use of height regulations and air rights"
could "reduc[e] sprawl and encourage[e] reasonable infilling so that public improvement and
service costs are reduced").
A recent example of a proposed high-rise building gaining favor for its proximity to a transit
center is New York City's recent approval of plans for a 1216-foot-tall skyscraper at 15 Penn
Plaza, just three blocks from the 1250-foot-tall Empire State Building, which was supported
in part because of the project's closeness to Penn Station. See Charles V. Bagli, Unwelcome
Neighborfor Empire State Building, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, at Al (noting that the 15 Penn
Plaza project "had the backing of Mayor Michael M. Bloomberg, whose administration has
long favored high-density development near major transit points like Penn Station" and that
the developer "earned zoning bonuses that will let it construct a building 56 percent larger than
what would ordinarily be allowed" because of the building's proximity to the transit hub).
For instance, the green benefits of vertical development have been part of the recent debate
over whether to loosen height restrictions in the District of Columbia. See Sabrina Tavernise,
In the Capital, Rethinking Old Limits on Buildings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/04buildings.html (noting that advocates for raising
the height restriction have argued that doing so "would allow for greener construction").
See Braverman, supra note 6, at 85-86 (describing municipal tree planting or preservation
programs in cities such as Boston, Chicago, London, New York, and Vancouver).
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conditioning usage during hot summer months.92 Trees can also help to
improve stormwater drainage,93 sequester carbon dioxide emissions from the
air, 94 and improve the aesthetic ambiance of city streets. 95 In certain circumstances, trees can even reduce heating energy costs on cold days by serving as
windbreaks for homes and other buildings. 6 Of course, trees must physically
occupy scarce airspace to perform these valuable functions.
Unlike buildings and trees, small wind turbines are a relatively new type
of structure competing to occupy urban airspace. Small wind turbines not
only require open airspace for adequate wind flow, but also fill substantial
airspace with their towers and rotor blades. Although wind energy devices have
historically been installed primarily in rural areas, permit applications to install
small wind turbines in suburban areas with heights upwards of 120 feet are
increasingly common."

92.

93.

94.

95.
96.

97.

See Energy Saving Landscapes, SUSTAINABLE URB. LANDSCAPE INFO. SERIES, http://www.
sustland.umn.edu/design/energysaving.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) (noting that
"[a]pproximately half of unwanted heat in a house in the summer comes from the sun shining
through the windows," and recommending the planting of trees to "[s]hade east and west
windows in the summer, where most solar energy enters the house").
See Braverman, supra note 6, at 84 (citing Harold A. Perkins et al., Inequit'ableAccess to Urban
Reforestation: The Impact of Urban PoliticalEconomy on Housing Tenure and Urban Forests, 21
CITIES 291, 292 (2004)) (explaining that "trees' roots can capture storm runoff associated with
urbanization processes").
See Sequestration Rates in US. Forests, Urban Trees, and AgriculturalSoils, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/sequestration/sequestrationrates.html (last updated June 22,
2010) (estimating that 58.7 million metric tons of carbon were sequestered from the atmosphere
by urban trees in the United States in 2002, totaling approximately 8.5 percent of all carbon
sequestered by plants and trees that year).
Braverrnan, supra note 6, at 86-87 (describing how world cities such as London, Melbourne, Tokyo,
and Toronto seek to enhance their "self-image" by emphasizing their abundance of trees).
See Energy Saving Landscapes, supra note 92 (noting that trees strategically planted near
buildings can "[c]reate windbreaks to block harsh winter winds, but allow cool summer breezes
to flow through"); see also Landscaping for Energy Savings, SUSTAINABLE SOURCES,
http.//bandscaping.sustainablesources.com (last visited July 31, 2011) (explaining that '[e]vergreen
trees on the north and west sides [of a building] afford the best protection from the setting
summer sun and cold winter winds").
See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, supra note 82, at 22 ("For many residential applications,
systems of 5 to 15 kW, turbines need to be on towers from 80 to 120 feet tall."). According to
the American Wind Energy Association, small wind turbine installations in the United States
increased by 15 percent in 2009. See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, supra note 85, at 3.
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TOWARD A GREENER THEORY OF AIRSPACE RIGHTS:
AIRSPACE GOVERNANCE RULES FOR AN ERA
OF SUSTAINABILITY

The sustainability movement's pressures to occupy or conserve open
airspace have prompted a wide range of new airspace governance rules in
recent years. 98 Unfortunately, many of these novel policy strategies unjustifiably
diverge from the ad coelum rule's valuable exclusion regime for airspace or
otherwise fail to efficiently allocate airspace among its potential uses. What
overarching principles should guide policymakers as they develop airspace
governance rules to reflect the resource's growing role in renewable energy and
sustainable land use? Parts III.A and III.B below describe two general
guidelines for future policymaking involving airspace.
A.

Fine-Tuning Rather Than Replacing the Ad Coelum Rule

An overarching principle is that new airspace governance rules should
build upon rather than deviate from the ad coelum rule's longstanding
exclusion regime for airspace. As described in Part I above, 99 laws founded
upon the ad coelum doctrine have helped to promote efficient airspace allocation
for centuries. New laws should neither ignore landowners' existing airspace
rights nor materially rearrange landowners' rights as a strategy for promoting
sustainability. In situations where high transaction costs among neighbors are
preventing the efficient use of airspace, governance policies involving options
or liability rules are a promising means of overcoming those barriers.
Theoretically, the ad coelum rule itself promotes the efficient allocation
of airspace rights because it plainly assigns airspace entitlements among
landowners. 0 0 So long as transaction costs are sufficiently low, the Coase
Theorem predicts that landowners holding those clear entitlements will buy
and sell easements and covenants among each other to allocate each cubic
inch of airspace to its highest valued use. 101

98.

Several examples of such rules are described and analyzed in Part IV, infra. See infra text
accompanying notes 134-213.
99.
See supra text accompanying notes 28-71.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39 (describing how the ad coelum rule provides for clearly
delineated airspace rights among landowners).
101. This is in part because adcoelum makes dear initial assignments of the airspace entitlements at
issue, which the Coase Theorem suggests greatly enhances the likelihood for voluntary bargaining.
See Coase, supra note 41, at 2-8.
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However, transaction costs among neighbors are often too high to allow
for successful Coasean bargaining over airspace, despite the straightforward
delineations of airspace rights under the ad coelum rule. When airspace rights
are not flowing to their highest valued use through voluntary bargaining, new
governance rules may be necessary to intervene and correct the problem.
Some jurisdictions have sought to overcome high transaction costs among
neighbors by enacting legislation that effectively reassigns airspace rights to
landowners who employ airspace for some specific favored use. Such rules
disregard landowners' long-held airspace rights and often result in suboptimal use of the airspace involved. Examples of such laws are discussed in
greater detail in Part IV below.102
Protecting airspace rights with "liability rules" in certain defined situations
is a more customized approach to the problem of high transaction costs and
may encourage socially valuable airspace uses without undermining the
centuries-old exclusion regime for airspace. Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed are credited with first recognizing the property rule-liability rule
dichotomy, which has become a staple of law and economics.'0o Existing
laws ordinarily protect airspace with property rules, meaning that one party
can acquire airspace rights from another only by purchasing those rights in a
voluntary transaction with their holder for a mutually negotiated price.' 04
Liability rules, on the other hand, would give landowners options to unilaterally
purchase others' nearby airspace rights for court-determined amounts approximating their value present rights holders.10 'When the option prices are
determined accurately,o 6 liability rule protection may promote allocative
See infra text accompanying notes 167-177 (describing prior appropriation-based solar access
laws and related statutes).
103. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
104. See id at 1092.
105. See id.
106. The risk of inaccurately determined option prices is a common criticism of liability rules. See,
e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:An EconomicAnalysis,
109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 728-29 (1996) (describing the "frequently heard argument" against
liability rules that a "court may not possess all the data necessary" to accurately estimate the
harm, meaning the option price, under liability rules). A particular fear in connection with
this reliance on third-party determinations is the risk that the option price will be set
excessively low, leading to inefficient transfers of entitlements under the rule. See Richard
A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral. The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 Yale L.J.
2091, 2093-96 (1997) (arguing against the use of liability rules based on an assertion that
the "risk of undercompensation" under liability rules "is pervasive given the inability to
determine with accuracy the losses, both economic and subjective, that follow when individuals
find that someone else has plucked away from them" previously held entitlements). However,
even Richard Epstein, a fairly strong critic of liability rules, has acknowledged that the rules
102.
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efficiency because rational landowners will only exercise the options if they
value the airspace rights at issue more than current rights holders are deemed
to value them. Further, liability rule approaches respect landowners' airspace
rights under the ad coelum rule's existing exclusion regime because they
provide for compensation to parties that relinquish those rights. Henry E.
Smith has expressly noted the potential usefulness of liability rules as a way to
"fine-tune basic exclusionary regimes in high-stakes contexts."to7 As illustrated
in Part IV below, liability rules provide a way for landowners to purchase the
airspace rights needed for government-favored renewable energy uses when
landowners are unable to acquire those rights through voluntary bargaining
with neighbors."
B.

Viewing Restricted Airspace as a Conservation Commons

Another overarching principle for airspace governance relates to the
increasing use of bulk and height restrictions to promote renewable energy.
The governance strategy set forth in Part III.A of protecting certain airspace
with liability rules can be useful for airspace disputes among two or three
parties. However, that strategy is less suitable for addressing conflicts among
large groups of landowners who intend to make several different uses of the
space. Local governments have long used bulk and height restrictions to govern
airspace rights in these large-number conflicts.' 09 For decades, such restrictions
have spared landowners from having to negotiate multiple easements or
covenants in order to keep surrounding airspace open and safeguard their
parcel's natural daylight, ambience, or views." 0

107.
108.
109.
110.

may be warranted in situations of "necessity and bilateral monopoly, where holdout problems
are likely to prove important." Id. at 2096, 2105-11. For a more detailed discussion of the
pros and cons of using liability rules in the wind turbine wake interference context, see
generally Rule, supra note 12, at 230-40.
See Smith, supra note 39, at 980.
See infra text accompanying notes 145-148.
For a basic background discussion on bulk and height restrictions, see supra text accompanying
notes 69-71.
Open airspace can sometimes have substantial value as a preserver of untarnished views of
lakes, oceans, waterways, mountain ranges, parks, or city skylines. See, e.g., Michael T. Bond,
Vicky L. Seiler & Michael J. Seiler, ResidentialRealEstatePices:A Room With a View, 23J. REAL
EST. RES. 129, 135 (2002) (describing an empirical study of 1999 tax assessment values of
1172 lakefront and adjacent properties in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, that determined that, "after
controlling for significant home chararteristics, the premium added to homes with a view" of Lake
Erie was $256,544.72).
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As described in Part II above,'1 some land use strategies require the
physical occupation of airspace while others demand that airspace be kept
open. Competition between these two mutually exclusive categories of airspace
uses is often evident in debates over bulk and height restrictions. The appropriate use of bulk and height restrictions theoretically builds upon the ad
coelum rule's exclusion regime because nearly all landowners in a jurisdiction
reciprocally share the burdens and benefits of such restrictions. However,
such restrictions are an inflexible type of governance strategy because they
effectively prohibit all trespassory uses within the restricted airspace.
What situations warrant the use of bulk and height restrictions to preserve
open airspace and when should landowners instead be free to occupy the space
with structures or trees? Analyzing this issue requires recognizing the distinction
between rival and nonrival uses of airspace and considering how a proposed
restriction might impact those two categories of uses.
1.

Rival vs. Nonrival Airspace Uses

Airspace differs from surface land in that several common uses of it are
nonrival-they neither preclude nor increase the cost of other nontrespassory
uses of the same space." 2 Consider, as an illustration, a ten-square-foot cube
of airspace situated fifty feet above the home of Ann, a hypothetical landowner.
Suppose that Ann relied on the airspace to help deliver solar rays from the sun
to her rooftop solar panel. Ann's use of the space for that purpose would neither
prevent nor increase the cost of her neighbor's concurrent use of the same
airspace to provide clear views of a nearby mountain range or downtown
skyline. In fact, a second neighbor could simultaneously rely on the same airspace
to help transmit sunlight to his strawberry patch and a third neighbor could
rely on the space to deliver steady air currents to a small wind turbine situated

111. See supra text accompanying notes 72-97.
112. The distinction between rival and nonrival consumption is a common economics concept that
is often discussed in connection with "public goods"--goods that are nonrival in consumption
and nonexcludable. See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 61 (5th ed. 1999) (stating
that a "pure public good is nonrival in consumption," which "means that once the good is
provided the additional resource cost of another person consuming the goods is zero"). Some
scholars have gone further, exploring the possibility of "intermediate" or "partially" nonrival
goods. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 951 (2005) (defining "partially (non)rival goods" as
"durable goods that have finite, renewable, and sharable capacity," and stating that "[w]hether
these resources are consumed nonrivalrously or rivalrously" typically depends on factors such as
resource management, the number of users, the types of potential uses, and the available
capacity). Brett Frishmann argues that lakes and the internet may fall within this category. See
id. at 952. Airspace seems to fit this classification as well.
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downwind. All of these landowners, and numerous others,"' 3 could simultaneously make productive use of the same cube of airspace without raising the
cost of several other nonrival airspace uses.
In contrast, some uses for airspace are highly rival,114 preventing or
increasing the cost of numerous other concurrent uses.11 5 If Ann were to
occupy the same cube of airspace with a tree or structure, the tree would not only
shade her own solar panel but could also obstruct neighbors' views,"' disrupt
valuable wind currents, and shade nearby gardens from the sun."'
Bulk and height restrictions prohibit rival uses within a specified volume of
airspace to ensure that it remains available for nonrival uses. Landowners
often rely upon the continued existence of bulk and height restrictions when
developing their parcels, expecting that the height-restricted airspace above
their neighborhoods will remain clear to serve valuable nonrival uses for the
relevant future.
113.

114.

115.

116.

117.

For example, several landowners can simultaneously utilize the same airspace as a medium for
transmitting radio waves or other forms of electromagnetic radiation at differing frequencies.
The use of airspace for such transmission is often rival within a given frequency but can be
nonrival vis-a-vis transmissions at other frequencies and even against some trespassory uses
such as trees or buildings. See Moore, supra note 21, at 56 (stating that radio transmissions
ordinarily "must be carried over different frequencies, because two or more radiowaves sent
at the same frequency interfere with one another[,]" resulting in the "cancellation or degradation
of the telecommunications content carried on that frequency"). The radio spectrum is thus
governed as a highly regulated commons, with federal regulations allocating transmission
rights among private and public parties. See id. at 60 (noting that the "radio frequency spectrum
within a nation is normally controlled and administered by an agency of the government,
such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) within the United States"). For purposes
of this Article, which focuses mainly on land use controls, the phrase "rival uses" is not
intended to encompass rivalry in use within the electromagnetic spectrum.
Rivalry in consumption is sometimes described as subtractability. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM
ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 6 (1994) (stating that goods and
events "differ in terms of the degree of subtractability of one person's use from that available to be
used by others[, and i]f one fisherman lands a ton of fish, those fish are not available for other
fishermen"). Ostrom and her coauthors famously separated goods into four distinct types (public
goods, common-pool resources, toll goods, and private goods) in a two-by-two diagram based
upon a good's subtractability and excludability. Id at 7. A given cube of airspace could theoretically
fit into any one of those categories depending on its location and the uses involved.
The primary list of "rival" airspace uses has remained largely the same for several decades.
See Ball, supra note 32, at 656 (describing, in a 1928 article, "trees," "projecting structures,"
"wires," "physical intrusion by man or his agents," the "[fWiring of projectiles," and the "passage
of balloons, airplanes, and the like" as the chief airspace uses that "involve an invasion" into
the space).
This highlights an important distinction relating to scenic views: Enjoying a territorial view
through a cube of open airspace may qualify as a nonrival use of the space, but erecting a tall
structure within airspace to access such a view is a categorically rival use.
As suggested above, use of airspace as a medium for transmitting electromagnetic waves is
often rival vis-i-vis similar transmission uses within the same frequency but may be nonrival
vis-A-vis transmission uses at other frequencies. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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2.

Anticommons Tragedies vs. Conservation Commons

In one sense, bulk and height restrictions create a sort of airspace
anticommons"' above a community-a regime in which "everyone has the
power to exclude everyone else from a resource, but nobody has the power to
enter or use that resource without the permission of everyone else.""' As
Michael Heller famously observed, resources subject to these regimes are
susceptible to anticommons tragedies-conditions of chronic underuse.120
Anticommons resources tend to go underutilized because of the high
transaction costs associated with attaining the numerous consents required
to utilize them. 121 Similar anticommons tragedies are arguably possible in any
airspace subject to bulk and height restrictions because multiple landowners
and their local governments have rights to exclude trespassory uses of
restricted space.
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky might alternatively categorize
much height-restricted airspace as a "conservation commons. "122 Bell and
Parchomovsky defined a conservation commons as a "commons whose most
efficient use is nonuse"12 3 or, more precisely, one whose most efficient uses are
nonrival and nontrespassory in nature. 124 This definition seems to describe
aptly the open airspace created by most bulk and height restrictions. Such

118. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy oftheAnticommons: Propertyin the Transition From
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
119.
120.
121.

Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 907, 926 (2004).
See Heller, supra note 118, at 624.
See Fennell, supra note 119, at 928-30 (describing how holdout and free rider problems create
costs that deter efficient use of resources within anticommons regimes). Hannah Wiseman has
aptly characterized properties suitable for commercial-scale renewable energy projects as
anticommons because landowners and multiple layers of public entities often possess the power
to block their development. See Wiseman, supra note 22 (manuscript at 26) (describing the
potential for individual landowners to prevent renewable energy projects by refusing to lease
their land to developers, and noting that "a number of municipal, state, and federal agencies
have opportunities to block the development through permitting processes, which are themselves
rights of exclusion"). She has argued that anticommons tragedies, marked by underutilization
of the resources at issue, are a likely result under such regimes. See id.
122. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, OfProperty andAntiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV.
1, 39 (2003). Michael Heller also seems to recognize the potential for this sort of anticommons to
be beneficial rather than tragic. See Heller, supra note 118, at 666.
123. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 122.
124. By "nonuse," Bell and Parchomovsky seem to mean "only nonrival uses." In their article, they
emphasize several nonrival, noninvasive uses for a public park as examples of the benefits accruing to
neighbors from a conservation commons. See id at 4 (noting that property owners abutting a public
park benefited from using the park as "a panoramic view, an acoustic barrier, and an air
freshener"). They also referred to "conservation" as "non-building" in the context of a conservation
commons. See id at 58.
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airspace is often heavily utilized, albeit in ways that do not require physical
invasion of the space.
An implicit desire to create airspace conservation commons capable of
protecting nonrival airspace use is the primary reason that many communities adopt bulk and height restrictions. Piecing together such protective
arrangements through negotiated easements and covenants can be extremely
difficult and costly, especially when large numbers of landowners are involved.
Free riding, holdouts, and other collective action problems can prevent neighbors
from successfully negotiating the private arrangements necessary to keep
neighborhood airspace completely open.125 Bulk and height restrictions are a
popular means of overcoming the collective action problems that might otherwise
prevent efficient conservation commons in airspace. Such restrictions conserve
airspace for nonrival uses without requiring unanimous landowner support.
On the other hand, creating a conservation commons in airspace requires
prohibiting any rival uses in the restricted space. Trees, buildings, and other rival
uses surrendered under bulk and height restrictions are sometimes highly valuable.' 26 In what situations does it make economic sense to prohibit rival airspace
uses in order to protect nonrival uses of the space? The following Subpart
describes a straightforward means of analyzing this question.
3.

A Model for Analyzing Restrictions on Airspace

Using bulk and height restrictions to create conservation commons in
airspace is cost-justified whenever the aggregate value of rival uses of a given
space is less than the damage those uses would impose on nonrival uses. A
simple abstract model helps to illustrate this principle. 127
Suppose that planners of a newly subdivided but undeveloped neighborhood
were contemplating whether to impose a 35-foot height restriction in the new
125. See id. at 25-29 (using the example of a city park to describe collective action problems that can
impede the preservation of conservation commons in the absence of governance intervention).
126. Descriptions of several valuable rival airspace uses are set forth in Part IIB, supra. See supra
text accompanying notes 86-97.
127. Although economists have empirically investigated the welfare impacts of height restrictions,
their studies have not accounted for all of the costs or benefits involved. See, e.g., Richard J.
Arnott &James MacKinnon, Measuring the Costs ofHeight Restrictions With a GeneralEquilibium
Model, 7 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 359 (1977) (setting forth a general equilibrium model
for residential height restrictions that focuses primarily on the impacts of residential height
restrictions on property tax revenues, land rents, and individual utility based on such factors
as the availability of recreational land); Bertaud & Brueckner, supra note 87 (analyzing the
impact of height restrictions on social welfare in Bangalore based primarily on incased
commuting costs). These other approaches are highly valuable, but none seems to focus on the
impacts of height restrictions on airspace.
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community. The restriction would prohibit landowners from erecting or
growing any structures in excess of that height on any of the hundreds of parcels
situated in the development. However, with the resulting conservation commons
in place, lot owners could confidently invest in windows, skylights, solar
panels, and gardens, and otherwise develop their land to make nonrival use of
the pristine airspace above the neighborhood.
If planners opted not to impose the height restriction, lot owners would
make rival uses of at least some of the airspace above the 35-foot mark. Those
rival uses would disrupt some territorial views, solar access, and natural
lighting, and would otherwise diminish the value of nonrival uses of the space.
Let:
N, = the aggregate social value of all potential nonrival uses of the
airspace at issue when protected by the height restriction;
R = the aggregate social value of all potential rival uses of the
airspace; and
No = the aggregate social value of all potential nonrival uses of the

airspace when not protected by the height restriction.
Based on these assumptions, 128 it would be cost-efficient to adopt the

proposed height restriction only if:
(N 1- No) > R

[Equation (1)]

In instances where Equation (1) holds true, imposing the height restriction to
create a conservation commons would maximize the productivity of the airspace
at issue.
This concept of weighing rival and nonrival airspace uses can also be
expressed in terms of the marginal social cost and benefit of increasing the

height level under a basic height restriction. To demonstrate that approach,
suppose that:
MC, = the incremental increase in (N - No), or marginal cost, of
disruptions to nonrival users of loosening a height restriction to allow
rival uses within an additional altitude inch of airspace; and
MB, = the incremental increase in R, or marginal benefit, to rival
users of loosening the height restriction to allow rival uses within

that additional inch of space.
A graph depicting these two functions appears in Figure A below. The
upward slope of the MC, curve reflects an assumption that the incremental

128. This model also assumes that any additional administrative costs associated with creating and
enforcing the restriction would be negligible. Such an assumption seems fairly defensible in
jurisdictions that already have land use controls and enforcement infrastructures.
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value of nonrival uses of protected airspace tends to grow with increasing height
within the airspace at issue. 129
FIGURE A. Optimal Restriction Height
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129. This assumption seems reasonable given that this analysis focuses on relatively low-level airspace
within 100-200 feet of ground level. Below those height levels, in most locations, a greater
number of landowners can make nonrival uses of a given cube of airspace the higher it sits in
the sky.
130. See Am. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, THE ARCHITECTs HANDBOOK OF PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE 754 (Joseph A. Demkin ed., 14th ed. 2008) (stating that "[a]bove six or eight
stories, unit costs per square foot tend to increase due to the costs of increased loads, wind
bracing, elevators, and fire code requirements"). Although this assumption is reasonable in most
instances, there are some noteworthy caveats and exceptions. For example, as already
mentioned, wind speeds tend to increase with altitude, so wind energy productivity is usually
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Under these assumptions, the socially optimal restriction height within
a given community, shown as H* on the graph in Figure A, is the height
at which:
MC= MB,

[Equation (2)]

Although it is difficult to estimate the actual values of N1, No, and R in
any given circumstance, it is possible to predict how various exogenous changes
might affect H*. For instance,13 ' the invention of a valuable new, nonrival
airspace use or a sudden boost in the value of an existing, nonrival use would
increase the overall cost of allowing rival uses in the airspace. As shown in Figure
B, such changes would shift MC upward to MC,, thereby justifying a more
stringent height restriction that prohibits rival uses below the height of H.
FIGURE B. Effect of a New, Nonrival Use
on Optimal Restriction Height
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marginal benefit curve for prime wind development airspace to be flatter than the curve for
airspace elsewhere-in observation that is consistent with the towering heights of many modern
wind turbines. The marginal benefit curve may also flatten in the occasional instance when
achieving a particular building height gives the building's upper floors particularly valuable view
access over nearby structures or geographic features.
131. For a discussion of how the introduction of solar access as an increasingly important nonrival
use is generating pressure to increase height restrictions, see infra text accompanying notes
179-181.
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In contrast, the invention of a valuable new rival airspace use or a significant rise in the value of an existing rival usel32 would increase the overall benefit
of allowing rival uses in the airspace at issue. As illustrated in Figure C below,
either of those changes would shift the MB, curve upward to MB,', thereby
justifying a loosening of height restrictions to allow rival uses up to a height
of H2 .
FIGURE C. Effect of a New Rival Use
on Optimal Restriction Height
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The preceding model provides a useful framework for analyzing the
appropriateness of particular restrictions on airspace arising in the context of
renewable energy. Its application requires consideration of how the proposed
restriction would likely impact the values of rival and nonrival uses of the airspace
at issue. Applications of the model to analyze specific, sustainability-related
airspace regulations follow in Part IV below.' 33

132. It is worth noting that innovations reducing the underlying production costs associated with
rival or nonrival uses often increase the net value of those uses. For instance, technological
innovations that reduced the construction cost of tall buildings or reduced the manufacturing
cost of wind turbines would likely increase the aggregate net social value of rival uses of airspace.
133. See generally infra text accompanying notes 179-187, 209-210.
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IV.

CASE STUDIES IN AIRSPACE GOVERNANCE: SUBOPTIMAL
AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

This Article now analyzes specific examples of misguided governance
rules that are causing the suboptimal use of airspace in the context of renewable
energy.' 34 Applying the principles set forth in Part III, the following case studies
seek to highlight deficiencies in existing policies and suggest possible alternative ways of governing conflicts over airspace.
A.

Imposing Wind Access Buffers to Avoid Turbine Wake Interference

Commercial-scale wind energy development is one context in which
suboptimal airspace regulations can arise.135 A commercial wind turbine creates
a "wake" of turbulent air that can reduce the wind energy productivity of other
turbines behind it for up to half a mile. 3 6 As a result, disputes may arise
whenever a developer proposes to install a wind turbine immediately upwind
of a competing developer's proposed turbine site.' 37 If both turbines were to
be installed, the wake from the upwind turbine would reduce the energy
productivity and profitability of the competing downwind turbine.' 5 Unfortunately, the law is far from clear regarding who prevails in these conflicts. This
legal uncertainty may deter wind energy developers on both sides from installing

134. 1 have published separate articles examining some of the real world examples described in this
Part under different analytical frameworks. See generally Rule, supra note 12, at 207-46 (analyzing
wind turbine wake interference conflicts); Rule, supra note 72, at 851-96 (comparing and
contrasting solar access laws); Rule, supra note 83 (examining laws aimed at overcoming local
regulatory barriers to landowners' installation of small wind turbines and rooftop solar panels).
135. To review my analysis of this issue under a different framework, see generally Rule, supra note
12, at 851-96.
136. See id. at 209-10.
137. To characterize one turbine site as "upwind" of another is to presuppose that wind tends to
blow in the same general direction most of the time. Such is usually true in areas deemed most
suitable for commercial wind energy development. See Ernest E. Smith & Becky H. Diffen,
Winds of Change: The Creation of Wind Law, 5 TEx. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 165, 186
(2010) ("A newly emerging issue is how to protect the flow of wind from adjacent, up-wind
property. In any given area wind typically blows from a predominant direction.").
138. For recent articles on wind turbine wake effects, see generally RJ. Barthelmie et al., Modelling
and Measurements of Wakes in Large Wind Farms, 75 J. PHYSICS CONF. SERIES 1 (2007),
available at http://iopscience.iop.org/1742-6596/75/1/012049/pdfljpconf775_012049.pdf
(describing various models used to measure wake effects at large wind energy projects); Martin
M6chali et al., Wake Effects at Horns Rev and TheirInfluence on Energy Production, EWEC (2006),
availableat http://www.dongenergy.com/S iteCollectionDocuments/NEW%20Corporate/
PDF/Engineering/40.pdf (describing the measurement of turbine wake effects at a Danish
commercial-scale wind farm).
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turbines within the vast, wake-sensitive areas near property boundary lines,
thereby effectively taking large quantities of valuable airspace out of use. 139
In at least one state, government officials have addressed the wind turbine
wake interference problem by imposing wake-based "wind access buffer"
setbacks along property lines on land zoned for commercial wind energy
development. 140 These buffer setbacks prohibit siting wind turbines within
quarter-mile-wide bands of property along boundary lines when wind
development is also occurring on the adjacent parcel. 141
Although the setbacks prevent neighbor disputes over turbine wake interference, they can create anticommons tragedies in the affected airspace. The only
conflicts that the wind access setbacks address are binary disputes between
neighboring wind farm developers over a single type of use-wind energy
generation. Because commercial wind energy projects are typically sited in areas
specifically approved for such development, there are no third-party, nonrival
uses at issue in these disputes that might warrant forming a conservation
commons.142 Laws prohibiting landowners from installing turbines in vast
139. For a more detailed description of how legal uncertainty over wind turbine wake interference
can frustrate efficient turbine siting, see Rule, supra note 12, at 209-10.
140. See, e.g., Order Establishing General Wind Permit Standards, Docket No. E,G-999/M-07-1102, at
7-8 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Jan. 11, 2008), available at http://www.windaction.org/
documents/14797 (establishing "wind access buffer" setbacks of five rotor diameters in the
prevailing wind axis and three rotor diameters in the secondary wind axis for any wind energy
project in the state of Minnesota having a total nameplate generating capacity of less than
25,000 megawatts).
141. See id at 4-5 (describing Minnesota's turbine setback requirements as preventing turbine
installations within five rotor diameters of "non-participating" property owners whose parcels
are at least fifteen acres in size on the predominant wind axis, and stating that these setbacks
will "protect wind rights and future development options of adjacent rights owners").
Modem ground-mounted commercial wind turbines often have rotor diameters in excess of one
hundred meters. See, e.g., Direct Drive Wind Turbine Reduces Complexity, SIEMENS, http://
www.siemens.com/innovation/en/news/2010/direct-drive-wind-turbine-reduces-complexity.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2011) (describing Siemens's SWT-3.0-101 turbine as having a rotor
diameter of 101 meters).
142. See, e.g., Katherine Daniels, N.Y. State Energy Research & Dev. Auth., Wind Energy: Model
Ordinance Options, N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEv. AUTH., Oct. 2005, at 3,
available at http://www.powematurally.org/programs/wind/toolkit/2 windenergymodel.pdf
(describing the practice of a local government creating "wind energy overlay zone[s]" with special
permitting standards in areas suitable for commercial wind energy development, and noting
that "[c]areful attention to potential visual and avian impacts in defining the overlay area can
greatly mitigate or even eliminate these issues when wind energy facilities are proposed"); see also
Anne C. Mulkurn, Wind Is the New Casb Crop in Rural Wash. Town, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/10/18/18greenwire-wind-is-the-new-cash-crop-in-ruralwash-town-3529.html (describing how Goldendale, Washington, "created the nation's first
energy overlay zone" in 2005 to expedite wind energy development in the area, "with the county
pre-approving several time-consuming studies that must be done before windmills can be
installed").

HeinOnline -- 59 UCLA L. Rev. 303 2011-2012

304

59 UCLA L. REV. 270 (2011)

areas on both sides of a property line create anticommons tragedies, relegating
large amounts of land and airspace to chronic underuse.' 43
The task of governing this novel type of land use conflict is complicated
by the fact that wind energy productivity is often location-specific. The strength
of wind can vary greatly from location to location based on local topography, 1"
meaning that one of two competing sites on either side of a property line can
sometimes have significantly greater production potential than the other.
Maximizing the wind energy productivity of a fixed amount of land and airspace
thus requires allocating airspace rights in ways that lead to turbine installations
in the most productive sites.
Theoretically, an exclusion regime that allocates the competing entitlement
to either of the two neighboring landowners would enable them to engage in
Coasean bargaining to allocate the airspace to its highest valued user. Laws
based upon the adcoelum rule could allocate the entitlement by giving landowners
the rights to capture wind in the airspace above their lands without liability
for downwind wake effects. An owner of property downwind of potential turbine
sites could then negotiate the purchase of voluntary easements or covenants from
his upwind neighbors if he believed his property had greater wind energy development value than the property of his upwind neighbor. Individual landowners
(or wind developers who have leased their land for development) seem to be in
the best position to identify whether an upwind turbine or downwind turbine
is likely to be more productive in any given circumstance and to act accordingly.
However, the success of Coasean bargaining depends on there being sufficiently low transaction costs, and transaction costs tend to be relatively high in
these situations. Wind developers are often business rivals so they likely cannot
rely upon social norms of neighborly behavior to motivate cooperation between
them.14 5 Instead, strategic behavior problems and other bounded rationality

143. Of course, the underuse of airspace in the instant case results from the absence of any wind
turbines within the airspace situated immediately above the setbacks in a general geographic area
that local officials and developers have already deemed suitable for wind energy development.
144. See, e.g., Wind Energy, AUSTL. GOVT, http://www.ga.gov.au/energy/other-renewable-energyresources/wind-energy.html (last updated Feb. 1, 2011) (stating that "[1]ocal topography and
other variability in the local terrain such as surface roughness exert a major influence on wind
speed and wind variability").
145. Robert Ellickson suggests that social norms among tight-knit neighbors might help to promote
bargaining for solar access and other common neighbor conflicts. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,

ORDER WITHoUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETILE DISPUTES 273 (1991).

However,

such norm-based governance is far less likely among commercial wind developers who have
merely entered into wind energy leases in adjacent lands.
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problems threaten to preclude successful bargaining in many instances.14 6 The
fact that the parties are in a "bilateral monopoly" bargaining position over a
unique, scarce entitlement also tends to raise transaction costs.14 7 Whenever
Coasean bargaining fails due to high transaction costs, turbines are installed in
suboptimal locations or not at all and valuable potential wind energy productivity is lost.
Assuming that there is significant public policy interest in promoting the
optimal use of wind energy resources, a new governance approach may be
warranted to help overcome the high transaction costs associated with neighbor
bargaining over turbine wake interference. As described in Part III above,"'
liability rule protection is a potentially useful way to supplement the ad coelum
rule's exclusion regime in response to this relatively new sort of conflict over
airspace for wind turbine use.
A liability rule-based governance strategy for wind turbine wake interference
could take the form of "waivable" wake setbacks in areas zoned for commercial
wind energy development.149 Under such an approach, landowners would be
free to install turbines within ordinary safety and aesthetics-based restrictions
anywhere in the airspace above their parcels without any risk of liability for
downwind wake effects. Setbacks sufficient to prevent wake interference would
be imposed on the downwind-most portions of each parcel. Landowners who
applied for permits to install turbines within those setback areas would be
required to send written notice to their neighbors immediately downwind,
who would have an option to pay the upwind landowners to make the setback
permanent. The option price would equal the economic value of the upwind
setback area for wind energy development, as determined by some preappointed
governmental body. Such price determination could be made relatively easily
based on submitted information regarding the current wholesale pricing for
wind-generated power and wind study reports for the setback area. So long as the
option price was not excessively low, rational downwind neighbors would
only elect to pay it and make the setback permanent, believing genuinely
146. See Rule, supra note 12, at 235-36 (describing the potential for strategic behavior problems
leading to higher transaction costs in interdeveloper negotiations over wind rights).
147. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 293, 298
(1992) (describing a bilateral monopoly as a situation where opposing parties' "previous investment
in their present position [is] sufficiently substantial and irreversible" and where bargaining with
each other is "a better solution than simply picking up stakes and moving elsewhere"). The common
rivalry between competing wind energy developers could also encourage strategic behavior,
which could further increase transaction costs.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 103-108.
149. For my own more detailed description of a potential waivable setback program, see generally
Rule, supra note 12, at 242-45.
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that the value of the potential wind energy preserved in their airspace justified
the expenditure.
This governance strategy would present its own challenges, 15 o but it
would be far less detrimental to aggregate wind farm productivity than an
outright prohibition on development under ordinary wind access setback
requirements. This approach would also help to address the problem of high
transaction costs that cause inefficiency in wind turbine siting decisions. It is
an example of tailored use of liability rule protection to fine-tune landowner
airspace rights under the ad coelum rule's exclusion regime.
B.

Restricting Wind Energy to Protect Military Interests

Another type of airspace conflict arising in commercial wind energy
development is the increasingly common dash between wind farms and military
bases. The current approach of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to these disputes overlooks landowners' airspace rights and diverges from
the principles set forth in United States v. Causby.'' The FAA's rules effectively
reassign the airspace rights involved from individual landowners to the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD), thereby enabling the DOD to acquire valuable
airspace easements without compensation. As the discussion below suggests, such
reassignments sometimes lead to underuse of the airspace at issue.
Most onshore commercial wind projects do not encroach into "navigable
airspace" because navigable airspace generally begins at five hundred feet
above ground level 52 and is a regulated "public highway" for general air travel.'
In the United States, commercial-scale wind turbines are typically sited in rural
areas where the turbines usually do not exceed heights of about 450 feet.154
Because wind farms tend to stay out of navigable airspace, they typically raise
no major conflicts in that regard.
150.

151.
152.

153.
154.

Specifically, there would be additional administrative costs relating to the valuation of waivable
setback areas. There would also be the potential for inefficient transfers of rights in cases where
valuations were too low. See supra note 106 (describing the undercompensation problem sometimes
associated with liability rules).
328 U.S. 256 (1946). A detailed discussion of United States v. Causby is set forth in Part I,
supra. See generally text accompanying notes 46-57, supra.
See supra note 53. It should be noted that the navigable airspace boundary for parcels of land
within six miles of some airport runways may be between two hundred and five hundred feet. See
14 C.F.R. § 77.17(a)(2) (2009).
Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
For a diagram and information comparing heights of some commercial wind turbines to other
tall structures, see Wind Turbine Technology Overview, N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV.
AUTH., Oct. 2005, at 6-7, available at http://www.powernaturally.org/programs/wind/
toolkit/9 windturbinetech.pdf.
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However, the U.S. military makes nonrival use of a large amount of
rural airspace below the 500-foot level in connection with its radar systems.
To protect the DOD's use of that additional space, FAA regulations allow
the DOD to delay or prevent wind turbine installations even when those
installations are dozens of miles away from any military base and would not
penetrate navigable airspace.ss The regulations require wind energy developers
to notify the FAA prior to installing any turbines exceeding two hundred feet
in height. Upon receipt of such notices, the FAA gives the DOD an opportunity to object to the installation. Based on a DOD objection, the FAA can
issue "a notice of presumed hazard,""' which can greatly hinder the development
of wind farms.
According to the American Wind Energy Association, nearly half of the
generating capacity of all proposed wind energy development nationwide in
2009 was either "abandoned or delayed because of radar concerns raised by
the military and the [FAA].""' Evidence suggests that many of those delays
or losses could have been avoided had the military updated its radar systems,
some of which were decades old." According to empirical studies the cost of
such equipment updates would have been much smaller than the cost imposed
on the wind energy industry from failed or postponed projects. 5 9
Should the U.S. military be entitled to take the equivalent of airspace
easements in vast stretches of non-navigable airspace for its own singular use
without compensating landowners? Or should such actions trigger an obligation
to pay just compensation to affected landowners who may consequently lose
lucrative streams of income they would have received under commercial
wind leases?

155. See Kate Galbraith, Gulf Coast Wind Farms Spring Up, as Do Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2011, at A23 (suggesting that the "Navy would like wind farm construction to stay outside a
30-mile radius of its facilities").
156. Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters, FAA Order No. JO 7400.2H (Mar. 10, 2011),
available at http://www.faa.gov/air-traffic/publications/atpubs/AIR/airO7Ol.html.
157. Leora Broydo Vestel, Wind Turbine Projects Run Into Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/business/energyenvironment/27radar.html?scp=1&sq= Leor/
20Broydo%2OVestel,%20Wind%20Turbine%20Projects%2ORun%2OInto%2OResistance,&st=cs.
158. See id. (stating that "many radar systems in use in the United States date back to the 1950s and have
outdated processing capabilities--in some cases,less than those of a modem laptop computer").
159. Empirical studies of this issue have suggested that radar system replacement is often the most
cost-effective option. See, e.g., Michael Brenner et al., Wind Farms and Radar, FED'N AM.
SCIENTISTS, Jan. 2008, at 8-9, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/wind.pdf
("The cost of a single radar installation was said to be in the range of $3-SM, to be compared
with the $2-AM cost of a single wind turbine, and the roughly $0.5M annual electric production of a
single turbine (5x106 kWh, at $0.10/kWh retail). A wind farm can have hundreds of turbines.").
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The question in these conflicts is not whether a conservation commons is
warranted to protect nonrival airspace uses but whether one particular airspace
use should be given universal precedence over another. In that sense, these
conflicts are materially different from conflicts over the potential aesthetic or
health impacts of wind farms160 or their effects on migratory birds.' 6 ' Here,
typically only two parties are involved in the disputes at issue: a military entity
and a wind energy developer. Nonetheless, FAA regulations can prohibit development in massive stretches of non-navigable airspace-a governance approach
ordinarily reserved for cost-justified conservation commons-to protect a
single entity's use of that space. Such rules result in underutilization of the
airspace at issue whenever the DOD is the "cheapest-cost avoider"162 and is
capable of updating its equipment at an expense far lower than the detriment
to the wind project.
Congress's delegation of regulatory authority to the FAA expressly requires
that the FAA's activities promote the "efficient use of navigable airspace."163
Unfortunately, the FAA's well-intended rules governing wind farms deviate
from their stated objective, regulating non-navigable airspace and doing so
in ways that can undermine its efficient use. By reassigning airspace entitlements
to the military, these FAA regulations enable the DOD to block wind farms

160. The most commonly reported conflicts over wind farms' use of airspace relate to their alleged
effects on neighboring residences or businesses. Neighbors have opposed wind farms based
on concerns over aesthetic impacts, flicker effects, noise, and other concerns. Under the abstract
model set forth in Part III, allowing commercial wind energy development in spite of these
impacts makes economic sense whenever the value created by allowing development in the
relevant airspace (R) exceeds the value of protecting neighbors' nonrival uses of the space (N No). Of course, measuring these variables is difficult, and overcoming local political opposition
to allow siting of wind farms in cases where R > (N - No) can also be challenging. Exploring
possible solutions to these conflicts is outside the narrow scope of this Article, but recent
articles by other scholars propose inventive means of potentially mitigating the difficulties of
commercial wind energy siting. See, e.g., Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting
Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289 (2011) (advocating a system of process preemption for
wind project siting similar to the system used for siting telecommunication towers); Garrick B.
Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY LJ. 877 (2011) (proposing an
approach that involves federal minimum standards for wind energy siting).
161. See Reimer & Snodgrass, supra note 10 (describing conflicts between migratory birds and
wind farms).
162. Initially conceived by Guido Calabresi, the concept of a least cost avoider has become commonplace
in law and economics literature. Generally speaking, the cheapest-cost avoider is the party who
can most cheaply avoid the conflict between the parties at issue. See Guido Calabresi, The Costs
of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 135 (1970); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 190 (7th ed. 2007) (stating that the "lower-cost accident
avoider" should take precautions necessary to avoid an accident); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 17 (1987) (using the term "least cost avoider").

163. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (2006).
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for little to no cost, thereby incentivizing in the DOD an excessive willingness to
obstruct these valuable projects.
A more efficient governance approach would be to require the DOD to
exercise its eminent domain power to acquire airspace easements when necessary to prevent wind energy development below the 500-foot level that
might interfere with its radar equipment. As some scholars have aptly noted,
affording eminent domain authority to government entities is in itself an
example of liability rule protection. 164 Such an approach would allow rural
landowners to retain their long-held legal entitlements in the non-navigable
airspace above their land. Under this strategy, developers could still be obligated
to send notice to the FAA for proposed structures exceeding heights of two
hundred feet. However, the DOD would have to respond to such notice by
either updating its radar equipment as needed or by exercising its eminent
domain authority to take an easement in or title to a sufficient amount of airspace
to protect the equipment from interference by wind turbines and to provide
affected landowners with just compensation. If operating under such a policy,
the DOD would purchase airspace rights above rural land for that purpose only
when it determined that doing so would be cost-efficient. The availability of the
eminent domain power in this situation is another example of how liability rules
can supplement the ad coelum rule in furtherance of particular policy objectives.
C.

Overregulating Airspace Under Solar Access Laws

Another context in which conflicts over airspace use are becoming more
common is rooftop solar energy development. Below are critiques of two types
of solar access laws that can cause the underutilization of airspace and a description of an alternative governance strategy better suited to protect solar access
while respecting airspace rights.
1.

Prior Appropriation-Based "Solar Rights" Statutes

As described in Part II above, legislation promoting the protection of
direct sunlight access for solar energy devices has existed for decades.1 65 Although
most solar energy devices require access to direct solar radiation to operate at

164.

Calabresi and Melamed specifically cited eminent domain as a type of liability rule. See Calabresi
& Melamed, supra note 103, at 1106 (citing the eminent domain power as a "good example" of
a liability rule approach).
165. For recent analyses of solar access laws in the United States, see generally Bronin, supra flute 4,
at 1226-35; Rule, supra note 72, at 878-80 (similarly criticizing the blanket nature of shadebased zoning setbacks).
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maximum capacity, landowners possess no inherent right to unobstructed
sunlight under prevailing common law.' 66 In response, many state and local
governments have enacted laws aimed at promoting solar access for users of
solar energy devices.
Some laws seek to protect solar access by seizing private airspace rights
from individuals without solar energy devices and then granting those rights to
landowners with solar energy devices. Neighbors who lose airspace rights under
these laws neither receive compensation from the government nor receive
compensation from the benefited parties. Laws in New Mexico and Wyoming
allow landowners to acquire the equivalent of a restrictive easement across
their neighbors' airspace without compensating their neighbors by being the
first to make "beneficial use" of the space for solar access.' 7 In these states, a
landowner who installs a qualifying solar collector,168 records a specific
document with the county clerk,169 and satisfies specific neighbor notice
requirements acquires a "solar right."170 A solar right is a legal entitlement to
an "unobstructed line-of-sight path from a solar collector to the sun" that
"permits radiation from the sun to impinge directly on the solar collector."'
Solar rights are essentially easements in neighboring airspace that prevent any
rival uses capable of disrupting solar access on a solar right holder's property.172
Based upon water law's prior appropriation doctrine,173 the New
Mexico and Wyoming solar access statutes purport to provide landowners
with "priority in time" as to sunlight with the "better right" vis-at-vis their

166. The preservation of building access to sunlight was historically a primary reason for regulating
open airspace, as evidenced by the English doctrine of ancient lights. However, United
States courts resisted adopting the doctrine in the twentieth century when artificial electric
light became commonplace. For a more detailed summary of the evolution of laws regarding
rights to light, see Rule, supra note 72, at 865-66.
167. Under the statutes in both states, "beneficial use" is the "basis, the measure and the limit of
the solar right." See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-4.B (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-22103(b)(i) (West 2011).
168. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-4.A; WYo. STAT. ANN. § 34-22-102(a)(i).
169. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-9; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-22-106.
170. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-3.B.
171. Id.; WYo. S TAT. ANN. § 34-22-102(a)(ii).
172. Language in New Mexico's statute expressly requires that a solar right be "considered an
easement appurtenant." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-8.
173. The prior appropriation doctrine is a common law doctrine embraced in several western states
that established and prioritized water rights among landowners based on landowners'
beneficial use of water resources. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 555 (1963) ("Under
[the prior appropriation doctrine,] the one who first appropriates water and puts it to beneficial
use thereby acquires a vested right to continue to divert and use that quantity of water against
all claimants junior to him in point of time. 'First in time, first in right' is the shorthand expression
of this legal principle.").
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neighbors.' 74 In reality, the resource at issue in these conflicts is not sunlight
but airspace-and subadjacent landowners have already been assigned rights
in that resource under common law. These statutes are transferring airspace
rights from neighbors to landowners with solar energy devices, overlooking
existing airspace rights and misapplying the prior appropriation doctrine.
Statutes in other jurisdictions do not expressly analogize to the prior
appropriation doctrine but give rise to the same practical consequences as
those in New Mexico and Wyoming. 7
Although such statutes may be a relatively low-budget way for state and
local governments to promote solar access, they can impose heavy costs on
landowners and the rest of society. Like the FAA regulations discussed above, 77
these solar access laws do not seek to create valuable conservation commons
to protect multiple landowners' nonrival uses of airspace. Instead, they offer
property interests in neighboring airspace as an incentive for landowners to
install solar energy devices. Airspace reserved for solar access under these
laws is no longer available for valuable rival uses such as buildings or trees, and
landowners installing solar panels on their property are not required to pay
anything to their neighbors to induce them from abstaining from those uses.
Whenever those rival airspace uses are of greater social value than conserving
the space for solar access protection and other nonrival uses, Equation (1)
above would not hold true. 7 In such instances, a solar panel user's exercise of
rights under one of these statutes results in suboptimal airspace use.
2.

Solar Access-Based Setbacks and Height Restrictions

Imposing blanket airspace restrictions to protect solar access can also
cause the underutilization of airspace. Solar access laws applying this approach

174. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-4.B(2); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-22-103(b)(ii).
175. For my more detailed critique of prior appropriation-based solar access laws, see Rule, supra
note 72, at 876-78 (criticizing prior appropriation-based solar access laws). Other commentators
have also challenged the use of the prior appropriation doctrine to promote solar access. See,

e.g., GAIL BOYER HAYES, SOLAR ACCESS LAW: PROTECTING ACCESS TO SUNLIGHT
FOR SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS 187-92 (1979).
176. Examples of such statutes include laws in Massachusetts and Wisconsin allowing municipalities
to adopt ordinances granting solar access "permits" that effectively preclude landowners from
occupying their airspace to the extent that doing so would shade a solar panel on neighboring
property. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 9B (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ t6.0403(2) (West 2003).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 149-162.
178. To review Equation (1) and related concepts, see supra text accompanying notes 127-129.
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can inadvertently create anticommons tragedies in airspace because they protect
solar access for solar energy systems that usually do not exist.
The model for airspace conservation commons set forth in Part II' 79
illustrates how the increased importance of solar access can create pressure for
local governments to adopt stricter bulk and height restrictions. Solar access is
a relatively new type of nonrival airspace use and is becoming increasingly
important due to generous government incentives and improving solar energy
technologies. 8 0 As shown in Figure B,"' the growing value of this nonrival use
shifts MCr upward and thus theoretically justifies at least somewhat more
stringent restrictions on airspace.
It is therefore no surprise that some communities seeking to encourage
solar energy development have adopted special ordinances restricting additional
airspace to better protect solar access. For example, an ordinance adopted in
Ashland, Oregon, imposes "solar setbacks" on much of the private property
within that jurisdiction.' 82 The solar setbacks aim to protect access for and
investment in solar energy devices by prohibiting any new structure that would
cast shadows above a certain height at the north property line. The practical
effect of this ordinance is that structure heights near the southerly boundary
of a given parcel are permitted to be taller than those in the northernmost
portions. Municipal ordinances in jurisdictions such as Boulder, Colorado,183 and
Soldier's Grove, Wisconsin, have a similar effect. 184
However, it seems doubtful that the upward shift in MC resulting from
the increasing value of solar energy is sufficiently large to dominate setback
height determinations in most communities. Solar access-based bulk and height

179. See supra text accompanying notes 126-132.
180. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 25D (2006) (providing for 30 percent federal income tax credits for installations
of solar panels); DSIRE, supra note 27 (providing a database of state-by-state information on statelevel incentives for renewable energy, including rooftop solar energy development).
181. See supra text accompanying note 130.
182. See ASHLAND, OR., MUN. CODE § 18.70.040 (2009). Language in the Ashland ordinance
makes dear that the ordinance was adopted to protect "the economic value of solar radiation
falling on structures, investments in solar energy systems, and the options for future uses of solar
energy." Id. § 18.70.010.
183. See BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE 1981 § 9-9-17(d) (Supp. 2009) (establishing "solar
fences" in particular zone areas of the city).
184. See SOLDIERS GROVE, WIS., ORDINANCES § 2.06 (1980), available at httpi//www.
smartcommunities.ncat.org/codes/soldiers.shtml ("Solar Access shall be protected in the following
manner. No structure, whether Principal Use or Accessory Use; and no plant materials, whether
trees, shrubs or other and no permanently fixed equipment shall be of such a height that it would
cast a shadow during daylight between 9 A.M. and 3 P.M. of the winter solstice on any portion
of another building or the buildable area of a parcel if no building exists. Compliance with this
standard must be graphically shown in Application for Zoning Permit.").
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restrictions are blanket restrictions that prohibit rival uses in all of the restricted
airspace within an area-not just above those lots situated near solar panels.
Given that there are currently solar panels on less than 1 percent of the
residential rooftops in the United States,' the nonrival use specially protected
by the restrictions is not even in existence more than 99 percent of the time. 8
Rooftop solar panels will need to become far more prevalent and cost effective
before one can reasonably assume that (N, - No) > R enough of the time to
warrant blanket restrictions for this purpose.
In most instances, such restrictions are likely to create anticommons tragedies and might lead to underuse
of the incrementally restricted airspace.
3.

A Better Way: Solar Access Protection Built Upon
the Ad Coelum Rule

Solar access laws in at least one jurisdiction strike a decent balance
between protecting solar access and promoting efficient allocations of the airspace
rights involved. Rather than unilaterally shuffling landowners' airspace interests
or imposing blanket restrictions that would create anticommons tragedies in
airspace, Iowa's approach' 8 respects and largely preserves landowners' longheld airspace rights.
Under Iowa's solar access statute, landowners who desire to prevent
structures on neighboring land from shading their solar energy devices may do
so only by purchasing airspace easements or covenants from their neighbors.
In that sense, Iowa's statute mirrors the existing laws for view and ordinary
land easements and is consistent with the ad coelum rule's exclusion regime.
Of course, solar energy advocates would rightly be dissatisfied if Iowa's
statute only went that far because the statute would provide no guaranteed
means for landowners to obtain enforceable solar access rights. In all cases
in which easement negotiations with neighbors fail, landowners under such a

185.

See Debbie Arrington, Seeds: Sun's Again RisingforArea Solar Industry, SACRAMENTO BEE,
June 20, 2009, at D1.
186. For additional discussion of these arguments, see Rule, supra note 72, at 878-80 (similarly
critiquing the blanket nature of shade-based zoning setbacks).
187. Other commentators have noted the potential inefficiencies of too aggressively protecting solar
access. See, e.g., Peter C. Hoffman, Mandating Solar Hot Water by CalfrniaLocal Governments:
Legal Issues, 1 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 71, 101 (1981) ("In attempting to guarantee
solar access for new construction in existing neighborhoods, a very difficult balance must be
struck between the recognized need to protect the solar user's right to meaningful use of his solar
hot water system and the neighboring homeowners' rights to use their property in a reasonably
unrestrained fashion.").
188. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 564A.4-.5 (West 1992).
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regime would have no way of acquiring solar access protection and could
therefore be deterred from installing solar energy devices on their property.
Much like for the wind turbine wake interference disputes described above,
negotiations over solar access often take the form of bilateral monopoly
bargaining,' which can sometimes involve significant transaction costs. Imperfect information, bounded rationality, and other factors can further thwart
Coasean bargaining for solar access rights.' 90 Inefficiency results whenever
high transaction costs frustrate neighbor negotiations that could have reallocated
airspace rights to their highest and best use.
Fortunately, Iowa's law has provisions enabling landowners to obtain solar
access protection despite failed neighbor negotiations for a solar access easement.
Providing the equivalent of liability rule protection for airspace in the narrow
context of solar access,"' Iowa's statute tweaks the ad coelum doctrine's exclusion regime to better facilitate solar access protection. In Iowa, a landowner
who is unable to strike a reasonable, voluntary bargain with a neighbor for the
purchase of a solar access easement can compel the neighbor to sell the easement
for its fair market value, as determined by the locally appointed governmental
board.' 92 Assuming that those valuations are accurate, 9 rational landowners
would only choose to compel such sales when the neighboring airspace at issue
is best suited for solar access protection and other nonrival uses.194 Iowa's strategy

189. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
190. For a detailed discussion of the potential obstacles to voluntary bargaining among neighbors
over solar access, see generally Rule, supra note 72, at 891-94 (mentioning administrative and
legal costs, the parties' bilateral monopoly bargaining position, imperfect information, holdout
problems, and the bounded rationality of the parties involved as potential impediments to
successful Coasean bargaining in the solar access context).
191. See generally id (explaining that Iowa's approach corresponds to "Rule Four" of Calabresi and
Melamed's famous model of property rules and liability rules because it gives pollutersneighbors who would shade the solar panels-the scarce entitlement at issue but protects the
entitlement with a liability rule.) To review Calabresi and Melamed's own description of their
model, see generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 103, at 1115-16.
192. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 564A.5.
193. As mentioned in connection with the use of liability rules in the wind turbine wake
interference context, the risk of undervaluation of entitlements under such rules is a commonly
cited weakness of liability rule-based policies. See supra note 105. However, despite the potential
for occasional undercompensation, Iowa's approach at least includes some sort of compensation
requirement in connection with the transfer of airspace rights to protect solar access. Although
Iowa's approach will not produce perfect efficiency every time, its compensation requirement does
make it more efficient and fair than prior appropriation-based approaches that provide no
compensation to landowners who are forced to forfeit valuable airspace rights under those laws.
194. Although landowners could potentially manipulate such a statute by using its provisions to purchase
their neighbors' airspace rights to protect nonrival uses other than solar access, careful statutory
drafting could largely prevent such strategic abuse. For a discussion of how Iowa's solar access
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is yet another example of how liability rules can supplement existing airspace
rights laws so as to further a broader public policy goal.
D.

Preemption of Local Laws to Accommodate Small Wind Turbines

Another type of airspace conflict arising in recent years involves the
growing number of state statutes that preempt local land use controls in order
to allow small wind turbine installations in suburban neighborhoods. 9 5 Small
wind energy devices can generate significant amounts of renewable electric
power and do not require new, costly transmission lines.' 96 As a result, state
and federal lawmakers have enacted programs aimed at aggressively promoting
landowners' installation of small wind devices.' 9 7 However, the turbines often
must rise well above local height restrictions to be fully effective, which creates
legal barriers to their installation in many communities.'" In a few jurisdictions,
local land use controls expressly prohibit small wind turbine installations because
of their potential impacts on views, aesthetics, and property values.199
Recent technological innovations and government incentives for small
wind turbines that have bolstered the significance of this rival use arguably justify
loosening suburban height restrictions in some areas. This effect was illustrated
in Figure C above, 200 in which the invention or increased value of a rival use
shifted the marginal benefit curve upward to MB,' and shifted the optimal
restriction height to H 2 .

195.
196.

197.

198.
199.

law is structured to prevent opportunistic behavior and for ideas on how to improve upon
Iowa's law in that regard, see generally Rule, supra note 72, at 891-94.
See infra notes 202-206 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the private and social costs of transmission infrastructures needed to support
commercial-scale renewable energy projects in remote areas, see generally Sara C. Bronin,
Curbing Energy Sprawl With Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547, 553-57 (2010) (describing
the recent studies on the impacts of energy sprawl).
Not surprisingly, these incentive programs are often grouped together with those for solar panels.
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 25D (2009) (providing for 30 percent federal income tax credits for installations
of solar panels); DSIRE, supra note 27 (providing a database of state-by-state information on statelevel incentives for renewable energy, including rooftop solar energy development).
Small turbine heights can be as high as 120 feet above ground level. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text. Suburban height restrictions are often set at approximately 35 feet.
See, e.g., SARATOGA, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 15-52.050 (2002) (restricting locations
within the jurisdiction where small wind turbines may be installed), cited in Ernest Smith,
Wind Energy: Siting Controversies and Rights in Wind, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'YJ.

281, 298 (2007); BLOWING ROCK, N.C., TOWN CODE § 16-149(C)(3) (prohibiting the
"installation, erection, or use of a wind energy system, wind turbines, and/or associated towers
for wind energy conversion" in all of the municipality's zoning districts), referenced in Jennifer
R. Andriano, The Power of Wind- Current Legal Issues in Sitingfor Wind Power, 61 PLAN. &
ENVTL. L., no. 5, 2009, at 3, 7.
200. See supra text accompanying note 132.
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However, many benefits of small wind turbine installations-such as
reduced carbon dioxide emissions and diminished reliance on fossil fuelgenerated energy-do not accrue at the local level.201 Because the potential
costs borne by localities from allowing small wind turbine installations often
exceed locally enjoyed benefits, many local jurisdictions are reluctant to revise
their land use controls to accommodate the devices.
Several state statutes seek to overcome local resistance to small wind
turbines by invalidating local land use controls that restrict small wind turbine
installation. Laws enacted in Delaware,202 florida, 203 New Hampshire, 204
Vermont,205 and Wisconsin 20 6 prohibit or significantly limit the ability of local
governments to restrict small wind turbine installations. Statutes that preempt
local height restrictions or setbacks to allow a particular rival airspace use are
prone to inefficiency. Such laws effectively dissolve airspace conservation commons and ignore officials' localized cost-benefit determinations regarding
airspace regulation within those jurisdictions.

201. For a recent description of some of the broad benefits of wind energy and other renewable
energy development, see generally Joshua P. Fershee, The Rising Tide of Climate Change: What
America's Flood Cities Can Teach Us About Energy Policy, and Why We Should Be Worried, 39
ENVTL. L. 1109, 1137-39 (2009) (describing climate change, jobs, and other benefits of
renewable energy development). The benefits of warding off climate change through greenhouse
gas reductions are shared worldwide, and many of the economic stability and job opportunity
advantages available through greater reliance on renewable energy also often accrue beyond a
single municipality.
202. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 8060 (Supp. 2003) (prohibiting a "county or municipal
government" in Delaware from adopting any land use regulation more restrictive than a specific
statutory standard that "prohibits or restricts the owner of a property from using a system for
obtaining wind energy for a residential single family dwelling unit").
203. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.04(1) (West 2006) (forbidding any local "governing body" in
Florida from adopting an ordinance that "prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting the installation
of. . . energy devices based on renewable resources").
204. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:63 (Supp. 2010) (providing that "[o]rdinances or regulations
adopted by municipalities to regulate the installation and operation of small wind energy
systems shall not unreasonably limit such installations or unreasonably hinder the performance of
such installations," and describing certain restrictions that constitute "unreasonable" limits).
205. See 27 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 544 (Supp. 2010) (providing that no municipality, by
ordinance, resolution, or other enactment, "shall prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting" the
installation of "energy devices based on renewable resources," with exceptions made for patio
railings in condominiums, cooperatives, and apartments).
206. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.0401(lm) (West 2003) (prohibiting political subdivisions in
Wisconsin from imposing "any restriction, either directly or in effect, on the installation or use
of. . . a wind energy system" that is more restrictive than a specific state-enacted standard or
from placing restrictions on any "wind energy system" unless the restriction (a) "[s]erves to
protect the public health or safety," (b) "[d]oes not significantly increase the cost of the system
or significantly decrease its efficiency," or (c) "[a]llows for an alternative system of comparable
cost and efficiency").
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Advocates for preemption statutes in this context might argue that such
laws are necessary to overcome the "positive externality" problem inherent in
renewable energy development.207 Local governments tend to discount the
benefits accruing outside their own jurisdictions when regulating land use.
Unless incentivized otherwise, a rational local official desiring reelection can
be expected to discount the broader social benefits of reduced carbon dioxide
emissions or less burdened regional electric power grids when deciding whether
to accommodate small wind turbines and will thus excessively restrict their
installation. Some type of state government intervention is arguably warranted
to correct this problem. 208
However, indiscriminately preempting local land use controls throughout
a state is an imprecise method of addressing the positive externality in this
context. Analysis of this issue can be framed within the conservation commons
model set forth in Part 111.209 Suppose that the airspace restriction at issue is a
suburban community's existing ordinance prohibiting small wind turbines
and other structures in excess of thirty-five feet and that the ordinance is at
risk for preemption by a state statute. Accounting for the positive externality
problem requires distinguishing the value of preempting the local ordinance
that would be captured by local citizens who installed small turbines from the
broader social value accruing outside of the jurisdiction.
Let:
R, = the aggregate value of small wind turbine installations resulting
from the preemption statute that would accrue to citizens within a
given local jurisdiction; and
R, = the aggregate socialvalue of the turbines, comprising the sum of
R, and any additional benefits accruing outside of the jurisdiction.
Because local governments tend to be most concerned about costs and
benefits within their localities, they are likely to focus on R rather than R, when
deciding whether to allow small wind turbines in their neighborhoods.

207. An externality exists when "the activity of one entity. . . directly affects the welfare of another
in a way that is not transmitted by market prices." Rosen, supra note 112, at 86. Generally, a
"positive" externality problem exists when the activity at issue benefits at least one other party
in a way that is internalized through market forces by the party or group engaged in the activity.
208. Other scholars have noted the potential need for government intervention to address
externality problems relating to sustainability. See, e.g., Carl J. Circo, Does SustainabilityRequire a
New Theory of PropertyRights?, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 91, 116 (2009) (suggesting that "subsidies
and regulations calculated to influence economic decisions" may be warranted "in circumstances
in which natural market forces are inadequate to assure that the externalities of an economic
decision properly figure into the cost-benefit analysis" (citing STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS

OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 108 (2004))).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 127-133.
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However, responding to that problem by invalidating local land use restrictions
on small wind turbines in every community in an entire state is only justified
if, in most local jurisdictions:
R,> (N - No)
[Equation (3)]
Equation (3) surely holds true in some communities but likely does not
describe many other neighborhoods where small turbines would significantly
damage valuable views and other nonrival uses. Thus, a blanket preemption
approach that forces all communities to allow small wind devices is an imprecise
and inefficient form of government intervention. In all local jurisdictions where
R, < (N - No), such an approach would generate a deadweight loss equal to
the difference between R, and (N - No).
Options-based rules that help communities internalize more of the social
benefits of accommodating small wind turbines are a more promising
governance approach in this context. State governments could address the
issue through a program that awarded annual property tax credits to qualifying landowners in all jurisdictions that had voluntarily amended their land
use controls to reasonably exempt small wind turbines or certain other renewable
energy devices. The state government would set the tax credit amount under
such a program based on its willingness to pay for ordinances in cities and
towns that welcomed small wind energy. An optimal tax credit amount would
equal the difference between R, and R, for each eligible community.2 10
A property tax credits program would better respect landowners' reciprocal
airspace rights arrangements under existing land use restrictions compared to the
blanket preemption approach. Specifically, the tax credits would compensate
landowners in jurisdictions that had voluntarily forfeited their rights to exclude in
height-restricted airspace by amending local controls to allow small wind
turbines. This approach would also be less likely to undermine airspace conservation commons in neighborhoods where it would not be cost efficient to do so. 211

210. It is worth noting that a rational, self-interested state government setting the tax credit
amount would only consider social benefits of gentler land use controls that would accrue
within state boundaries, which would equal some amount less than Rs. A tax credit amount
fixed by the federal legislature would probably more closely approximate R, but would still likely be
less than R, because some of the benefits of renewable energy-such as reduced carbon
dioxide emissions and reduced demand for fossil fuels-are globally shared. Still, providing
at least some tax credit amount would help overcome some of the externality problem without
supplanting local land use decisionmaking and thus seems superior to existing policy strategies.
211. For example, allowing small wind turbines in the backyards in a neighborhood with highly
valuable views may not be cost efficient. For a detailed discussion on the disadvantages of a
blanket preemption approach in this context, see generally Rule, supra note 83, at 1252-54
(describing how a blanker preemption statute invalidating local restrictions on small wind turbines
might impact a hypothetical beachfront town).
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So long as the local democratic process worked properly, only those communities that placed a particularly high value on protecting nonrival airspace uses
such as views and aesthetics would opt to retain existing land use restrictions
and forgo receiving the tax credits.212 By paying proportionately higher property
taxes, those communities would effectively purchase the right to contribute
less than their fair share toward statewide renewable energy goals. 1
CONCLUSION

Renewable energy development and sustainable land use are causing
airspace to become more valuable than ever before. Innovative laws are needed
to govern the new airspace conflicts arising from these changes and to prevent
them from unnecessarily hindering sustainable development. This Article
advances two general principles to help guide policymaking aimed at allocating
airspace among its increasingly complex web of uses.
First, new laws responding to the escalating value of airspace will be
most effective and efficient if they are structured in ways that acknowledge
landowners' long-held airspace rights. The exclusion regime founded under
common law's ad coelum doctrine is beneficial in that it clearly delineates among
landowners' respective interests in airspace. By assigning unambiguous legal
entitlements among landowners, this regime enables landowners to bargain
with each other more freely and thereby allocate airspace rights to their highest
valued use.
When high transaction costs prevent the reallocation of airspace to
important uses such as wind energy or solar access, policymakers should not
ignore or radically alter existing airspace rights. An alternative approach that
builds more firmly upon the ad coelum rule's valuable exclusion regime is to

212. Tax credit programs can be susceptible to strategic abuse, but carefully structuring the programs
can reduce the likelihood of such opportunistic behavior. For a more in depth discussion of these
risks and possible ways of mitigating them, see id. at 1272-73.
213. The concept of requiring each neighborhood in a jurisdiction to host its own "fair share" of
locally undesirable land uses (LULUs) is not new. See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do
With It? EnvironmentalJusticeand the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL
L. REv. 1001, 1077 (1993) (describing New York City's charter provisions aimed at ensuring that
"each of its neighborhoods bears its fair share of the burden of LULUs"). Programs allowing some
communities to purchase the privilege not to host LULUs in such contexts have proven
controversial in the affordable housing context. See ROBERT C. ELLIcKSON & VICI L. BEEN,
LAND USE CONTROLS 778 (2005) (describing the scholarly debate over the merits of programs
that allowed communities to sell their statutory obligations to host affordable housing projects to
other jurisdictions through "[r]egional contribution agreements"). However, arguments against
such arrangements are less compelling when the LULUs at issue are merely renewable energy
devices restricted for aesthetic reasons.
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merely protect airspace rights with a liability rule rather than a property rule
when some socially important use, such as wind or solar access, is at issue. If
appropriately tailored, policies providing for liability rule protection in these
settings can facilitate efficient airspace rights transfers among landowners that
might otherwise be thwarted by high transaction costs.
Second, before adjusting bulk and height restrictions in response to a
new airspace use, policymakers should weigh the potential impacts of such
actions on both rival and nonrival uses of the space. Some airspace is most
valuable to society as a conservation commons in which physically occupying the
space is prohibited so that it can better serve nonrival uses. Sustainability-driven
uses of airspace, such as wind and solar energy development, can create political
pressure to loosen or tighten height restrictions and to alter existing conservation
commons. However, the discovery of a single new airspace use often does not
justify sweeping changes in airspace regulation. Before acting on such pressure
by implementing a broad law aimed at promoting a particular use of airspace,
policymakers should recognize and weigh the law's likely effects on both rival
and nonrival uses of the airspace at issue.
Renewable energy and sustainable land use are rapidly gaining importance
in local and national policy, so even greater competition for airspace will likely
develop in the years to come. 214 Innovative new policies built firmly upon the
centuries-old property rights regime for airspace are the most promising means
of promoting the efficient use of this precious resource well into the future.

214.

For example, NASA's recent interest in the development of airborne wind turbines that would
be tethered to the ground and float thousands of feet above the ground suggests the potential
for new kinds of airspace conflicts involving wind energy in future years. See-An Answer to Green
Energy Could Be in theAir, NASA (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.nasa.gov/topics/technology/
features/capturingwind.html (describing new research on airborne wind turbine designs funded
through a $100,000 grant from the federal government to NASA's Langley Research Center).
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